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EXPRESSIVISM, EMPATHY AND EQUALITY
Rachel D. Godsil*
In this article, Professor Godsil argues that the Supreme Court should not limit its
application of heightened scrutiny to facially neutral government actions moti-
vated by discriminatory intent, but rather, that the Court should apply such
scrutiny when the challenged government action expresses contempt or hostility
toward racial, ethnic, and gender groups or constitutes them as social inferiors or
stigmatized classes. This article builds upon recent scholarship seeking to trans-
plant this form of expressivism from the Establishment Clause to the Equal
Protection context. However, this article contends that this scholarship has mis-
conceived the test to be applied. For any expressive theory, the operative step is
determining whether a government action sends a proscribed message. Most ex-
pressivist scholars have argued that the meaning of government action should be
determined from the perspective of a "universal" objective observer; the standard
adopted by Justice O'Connor in the Establishment Clause Cases. Professor Godsil
argues that a universalist objective observer standard will underserve the goals of
expressivism and the Equal Protection Clause by marginalizing the views of those
affected by the government action. This article proposes instead that the meaning
be determined from the perspective of a reasonable member of the allegedly affected
community. This refined expressive harm test will require the judge to empathize
with the affected community to determine how a reasonable member of that com-
munity would view the challenged action. A reasonable community member
standard will also lead to a greater degree of objectivity in judicial decisions be-
cause the individual judge's views will not necessarily prevail.
INTRODUCTION
Outright expressions of racial bigotry have been largely elimi-
nated from our public discourse.' However, numerous studies tell
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law; J.D. 1992, University of
Michigan Law School. I would like to thank to Michelle Adams, Mark Alexander, Kathleen
Boozang, Angela Carmella, Carl Coleman, Sheila Foster, Jim Freeman, Tristin Green, Don
Herzog, Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Solangel Maldonado, Michael McConnell, Jon Romberg,
Michael Risinger, Daniel Solove, Charles Sullivan, and Sarah Waldeck for their comments
and insights on earlier drafts of this article and the ideas inspiring it. I would also like to
thank the Seton Hall University School of Law Summer Research Stipend Program for its
financial support, and Devon Corneal, Joseph Groshong, and Aimee Hamoy for truly
invaluable research assistance.
1, Tristin Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 91, 95 n.il.
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us that more subtle forms of racial bias continue to exist,2 even
among those who believe themselves to be non-racist.3 This form of
bias translates into the tendency of people unthinkingly to treat
more favorably those who belong to their own racial group and to
judge more harshly those who belong to other racial groups.4 Gov-
ernment actors are unlikely to be immune from this phenomenon.5
Indeed, examples abound of circumstances in which government
actions disproportionately benefit white communities or harm
people of color: enforcement of environmental laws is more strin-
gent in white communities; noxious land-uses are more likely to be
placed in communities of color; a black defendant is more likely to
be charged with a capital offense if the alleged victim is white; and
people of color are more likely to be imprisoned for longer peri-
ods of time for nonviolent drug offenses. 6
Yet when minority plaintiffs seek redress under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, the Supreme Court requires proof that the government
actor possesses an intent to discriminate. Civil rights advocates and
many scholars have countered that the intent test is inherently
flawed because it suffers fatal problems of proof and fails to un-
cover the more prevalent unconscious bias. While this issue has
been debated for decades with little effect, there are two persuasive
reasons to revisit the issue now.
The first is pragmatic: until recently, the practical effect of the
Court's adoption of the intent test was ameliorated considerably by
2. See Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997) (noting that there is a "broad consensus that discrimination
today is generally perpetrated through subtle rather than overt acts.").
3. Green, supra note 1, at 95-96. This form of bias has been named "aversive racism"
and refers to the practice of acting upon unconscious negative feelings by those who believe
themselves to be non-racist. Id. at 8.
4. See Ian Haney L6pez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New Theory of Ra-
cialDiscrimination, 109 YALE LJ. 1717, 1813 (June 2000) (citing social science studies).
5. Id. at 1723.
6. See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. State of New York, 86 N.Y.2d 307 (1995);
DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1999); LuKE COLE & SHEILA FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM & THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2000) (discussing the
evidence that government actions have resulted in a disparate burden of pollution upon
minority communities).
7. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). In its stated standard, the Court recog-
nizes that there may be mixed motives behind a given decision and requires only that a
decision-maker select a course of action "at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite
of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1977). However, at least one commentator has noted that "the Court has only seen dis-
crimination, absent a facial classification, in the most overt or obvious situations-situations
that could not be explained on any basis other than race. Whenever the Court found room
to accept a nondiscriminatory explanation for a disputed act, it did so." Selmi, supra note 2,
at 284.
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federal regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which provided that any federally-funded action hav-
ing a disparate impact upon a racial group constituted a violation
of Title VI. 8 Thus, since the late 1960s, civil rights plaintiffs had
access to a disparate impact standard to challenge governmental
activities that disproportionately affected them.9 However, in 2001,
the Supreme Court held that there is no private right of action
under the regulations.'0 Because the Court had previously held
that Title VI itself "proscribe [s] only those racial classifications that
would violate the Equal Protection Clause,"" civil rights plaintiffs
must now meet the elements necessary to prove intent.
The second reason to revisit the viability of the intent test is
jurisprudential. In recent Establishment Clause, voting rights, and
affirmative action cases, the Supreme Court has reinvigorated a
strand of constitutional interpretation that assesses whether the
message sent by a government action comports with the underlying
values embodied in the constitutional provision at issue. 12 This
method has been named expressivism. Expressivist scholars have
developed a rich literature detailing the contours of expressivist
theory and its application to constitutional adjudication." These
8. Paul K. Sonn, Note, Fighting Minority Underrepresentation in Publicly Funded Construc-
tion Projects After Croson: A Title VI Litigation Strategy, 101 YALE L.J. 1577, 1581 n.25 (1992)
(citing Title VI disparate impact regulations promulgated by the Departments of Labor,
Agriculture, Energy, Commerce, State, Housing & Urban Development, Justice, Labor,
Treasury, Defense, Education, Veterans Affairs, Interior, Health & Human Services, and
Transportation).
9. This is not to say that civil rights lawyers brought every case in which a government
action resulted in a racially disparate impact. The practice at the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund, where I was an assistant counsel in the mid 1990's, was to bring only
cases that showed what we called colloquially "disparate impact plus" or where as Ted Shaw,
the Deputy Director Counsel would say, there was "race in the air." This article stems largely
from my efforts to elucidate what it means for there to be "race in the air."
10. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). The Sandoval decision left open the
question of whether Title VI regulations created rights that could be enforced by individual
plaintiffs under § 1983. While the first court to consider this question found § 1983 did
create a federal right, the decision was subsequently reversed by the Third Circuit. S. Cam-
den Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 145 F. Supp. 2d 505 (D.N.J. 2001), rev'd
274 E3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).
11. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978).
12. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Ada-
rand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
13. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimen-
sion of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. Rev. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Hellman, The Expressive
Dimension]; Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive Govern-
ment, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REv. 653 (2001) [hereinafter
Hellman, Judging by Appearances]; Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
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recent cases provide clear support for a reevaluation of the intent
test, and the literature lays the groundwork for the adoption of a
test rooted in expressivist theory.
In this article I contend that expressive harm theory, as devel-
oped by scholars and embodied in recent Court decisions, is a
potentially powerful approach; but if it is adopted as currently
conceived by scholars, the theory will fail to achieve the goal of
ensuring that the government provides equal concern and respect
to all. 14 Prominent expressivist scholars have argued that the mean-
ing of government action should be determined from the
perspective of an "objective observer," the standard adopted by
Justice O'Connor in the Establishment Clause cases.1 5 This objec-
tive observer standard presumes that different racial and gender
groups place the same meaning upon the expressive content of a
government action that affects them differently. I will thus call it a
"universal" objective observer standard. This assumption of univer-
sality lacks support in the philosophical, sociological, and legal
literature. It has become conventional wisdom that whites and
blacks view issues like police brutality, racial profiling, or the ap-
propriateness of OJ. Simpson's acquittal very differently based
upon their life experiences. In other words, contrary to any as-
sumption of a universal meaning, it seems quite clear that, in
charged contexts, the same actions or set of circumstances may be
perceived very differently depending on the perspective of the ob-
server. Therefore, the meaning assigned to such actions is
inherently rooted in the perspective of the person interpreting
them. There is no inevitable message that lies beyond the particular
beliefs and values of the interpreter.'6
PA. L. REv. 2021 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Expressive Function]; Cass R. Sunstein, Social
Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996) [hereinafter Sunstein, Social Norms].
14. Ronald Dworkin has long argued that the underpinning of the Equal Protection
Clause is the guarantee that government provide equal concern and respect-this does not
mean equality of result, but it means more than that the government refrain from the most
virulent form of racism. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1978).
15. See WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA: RELIGIOUS Dis-
COURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1994); Anderson & Pildes, supra
note 13. But see Hellman, The Expressive Dimension, supra note 13, at 22-23.
16. Of course, some messages are so clear that perspectival differences are highly
unlikely to arise. If that were not the case, ordinary communication among people who
speak the same language would be much more difficult than it in fact is. For example, the
message of a red octagonal sign at the corner of a road containing the letters "stop" is that
motorists must stop their car. It is expected that everyone driving on the road will receive
the same message regardless of their perspective. This article is concerned with the subset
of messages in which the shared meaning is likely to be contested and where the basis for
the contest will be a different racial or gender experience.
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The question, then, is whether the reality of differing interpreta-
tions should have legal significance in the Equal Protection
context. This article argues that it must. It proposes that the mean-
ing of a government action be determined from the perspective of
a reasonable member of the allegedly affected community. 7 A uni-
versal observer standard in practical application will likely lead
judges to interpret the expressive content of the government's ac-
tions from their own point of view-after all, the judge is an
"objective observer" to the extent that the judge has no stake in
the outcome of the dispute. However, federal judges are over-
whelmingly upper middle class white men. 8 If the interpretations
of judges from this subgroup are considered the "universal" mean-
ing of government action, then the objective meaning will closely
resemble the interpretation of that particular group. Because the
government actors are also likely to be members of the majority
white group, the judge will very likely perceive the action the same
way the government actor did. Unless the government actor is an
overt racist, he would be unlikely to engage in an action he
thought expressed contempt and hostility toward a racial group or
stigmatized them as a pariah class. However, someone from a racial
group that has historically experienced discrimination and who
has suffered previous ill treatment from the government may in-
terpret this same action very differently. Yet, her interpretation will
not be considered valid under the "universalist" objective standard,
and she will therefore be further marginalized when her interpre-
tation of the meaning of a government action departs from the
17. As with any reasonableness standard, the reasonable community member standard
is not subjective-it does not simply require the judge to compile the actual responses of
conimunity members. Rather this standard requires the judge to create a construct-the
reasonable member of the affected community-and to decide what meaning this objec-
tively reasonable person would assign to the government action. The views of actual
community members will necessarily inform the judge's decision, but this standard does not
mean that plaintiffs will automatically prevail. This inquiry-whether to apply a universal
test to determine reasonableness or to narrow the universe to a subgroup within the uni-
verse-is familiar from tort cases and scholarly commentary upon such cases. For a detailed
discussion in the tort context, see GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATITUDES AND THE
LAw 26-30 (1985).
18. Sherilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confi-
dence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 405, 407 n.3 (2000) (citing Miles to Go: Progress of Minorities in
the Legal Profession 9 (ABA Comm. on Opportunities for Minorities in the Profession ed.,
1998)). As of 1998, African Americans comprise only 3.3% of judges. Over 90% of all fed-
eral appellate judges were white. Only one federal appellate judge is Asian American. As of
1999, 79.4% of federal judges were men. Employee Relations Office, U.S. Courts, The Judi-
cial Fair Employment Practices Report, (Fiscal Year 1999). As of 1991, 91% of state judges were
men. BARBARA A. CURRAN & CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE
U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1990s (1994).
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"objective" interpretation. The universalist objective standard thus
not only fails to capture the reality of differing perceptions, it also
has the effect of finding the view held by the majority to be correct
and objective, and communicating that the minority's view is con-
fused or misguided.
The refined expressive harm test I propose, if practiced in good
faith by judges, should have other salutory effects for both judicial
decision-making and governance. The current intent standard re-
quires the court to look only at the information possessed by and
potential motives of the government actor, thereby rendering ir-
relevant the point of view of the allegedly affected community.'
9
The current standard also expressly requires the court to find that
the challenged action was taken at least in part because of racial
animus.° By so directing the court's inquiry, the current intent
standard requires the trial judge to stand in the shoes of the gov-
ernment actor to assess whether racial animus might have existed.
Standing in someone else's shoes is an integral part of what cogni-
tive theorists call perspective-taking empathy.2' Given the equality
norms currently espoused, if not always followed by our society,
most judges will be extremely reticent to conclude that a govern-
ment actor with whom he has been invited to empathize is a racist.
By contrast, an expressive harm test that requires the court to
determine the expressive content of the government action by dis-
cerning how a reasonable member of the allegedly affected
community would view the action will invite the judge to empa-
thize with the community rather than the allegedly discriminating
government actor. Such a focus is consistent with the constitutional
goal of ensuring equal concern and respect.22 It will also provide
an incentive for government actors to engage in the same sort of
empathy to ensure that their actions are constitutional.
Part I of this article sets forth the origins of expressive or stig-
matic harm theory in the Supreme Court's Equal Protection
jurisprudence beginning with Strauder v. West Virginia,3 and its un-
19. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 245 (1976).
20. Id.
21. BECKY LYNN OMDAHL, COGNITIVE APPRAISAL, EMOTION, AND EMPATHY, 17-20,
227-28 (1995).
22. DwORKIN, supra note 14, at 180. Dworkin's notion that the Equal Protection
Clause requires that government provide "equal concern and respect" to members of dif-
ferent racial groups is widely accepted as the appropriate norm. A similarly well-accepted
notion is that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits government from engaging in "selec-
tive indifference" to the concerns and interests of members of suspect classes. The two
concepts are mirror images of each other--one positive and the other negative-and this
article will utilize this combined notion as the appropriate goal of any standard for measur-
ing whether a government action is in compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.
23. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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examined disappearance when the Court adopted the intent test
in Washington v. Davis.2 4 This Part critiques the intent test and con-
tends that the Court's replacement of a stigmatic harm test with
the intent test was both unjustified and unjustifiable. Part II addi-
tionally argues that the intent test requires judges to empathize
with government actors and to ignore the perspectives of those
claiming harm.
Part II describes the re-emergence of stigmatic harm theory in
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and those Equal
Protection Clause cases addressing the creation of majority-
minority districts and affirmative action plans. This section then
describes the academic exploration of the theory, renamed "ex-
pressive harm theory" by Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi, and
then elaborated upon in a seminal article by Pildes and Elizabeth
Anderson.
Part III sets forth an alternative test in which government ac-
tions are evaluated to determine if they express a lack of equal
concern and respect as perceived by a reasonable member of the
affected community. The standard is philosophically more sound
than the universalist objective observer standard because it ac-
knowledges that the perceived meaning of the government action
may be contingent upon the perspective of the recipient of the
message. In light of this "contingency of meaning," this test pro-
vides clear direction to courts on which perspective should trump.
Ironically, because this standard does not simply allow the view of
each individual judge (or panel of judges) to prevail, the reason-
able member of the affected community standard is more likely to
lead to decisions that are "objective" than the universalist objective
observer standard.2 5
Part IV provides examples of how the proposed test would work
in application. This Part will also address the argument that the
test engages in the type of essentialism that itself undermines the
Equal Protection clause. This Part concludes that while the danger
of essentialism is certainly cause for concern, the benefits of a rea-
sonable community member standard exceed the risks. First, the
group from which the reasonable member is drawn is not perma-
nent-it is defined and circumscribed by the context of the
government's alleged harm, not by any underlying assumptions
about the nature of a racial or ethnic group in general. Second,
24. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
25. I do not mean objective in any metaphysical sense, but rather that decisions will be
more likely to transcend the particulars of the decision-maker.
WINTER 2003]
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the test does not require the (clearly wrong) view that people who
share membership in racial or gender groups feel the same way
about an issue; it only recognizes that they may have greater sensi-
tivity to the question of whether they have been treated unfairly
than members of the majority or dominant group. Finally, even an
imperfect reasonable community member standard is better than
an attempt to seek a universal truth that will wholly marginalize
minority groups.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE:
STIGMATIC HARM AND INTENT
While the academic focus upon expressive theories of law is
relatively new,26 it is widely acknowledged by commentators that
the Supreme Court's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence has
included a strand of analysis focusing upon the stigma caused by
government action that looks very much like what is now called
expressive harm theory. Commentators have not, however, focused
attention upon how the Court abandoned its emphasis upon stig-
matic harm. This Part describes the trajectory of the Supreme
Court's Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence from the earliest
interpretations following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the present. The cases in which the Court applied a
stigmatic harm test in good faith served an important function in
the progression of race relations in this country by proscribing
government action that sent a message that blacks were inferior.
This conclusion is well illustrated by the Court's most famous ap-
plication of a stigmatic harm test, Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka,27 as well as by subsequent decisions invalidating statutes re-
quiring segregation. This Part then examines the cases in which
the Court abandoned its focus upon stigmatic harm and instead
adopted the intent test. This change occurred without explanation
or justification.
26. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 13; Hellman, The Expressive Dimension, supra note 13;
Hellman, Judging by Apearances, supra note 13; Sunstein, Expressive Function, supra note 13;
Sunstein, Social Norms, supra note 13. The University of Maryland Law Review devoted an
issue to a symposium exploring the philosophical and legal issues raised by expressivist
theory. See, e.g., Marcia Baron, The Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REv. 607
(2001); Simon Blackburn, Group Minds and Expressive Harm, 60 MD. L. REv. 467 (2001);
Steven D. Smith, ExpressivistJurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REv. 506
(2001).
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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A. Defining Discrimination as Sending a Stigmatic Message:
Early Interpretations of the Equal Protection Clause
Strauder v. West Virginia was the second case interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause after its adoption and the first in which
28
the Court referred to the constitutional harm of a state's message.
In Strauder, a black man challenged his murder conviction by an
all-white jury on the ground that the West Virginia statute that lim-
ited jury service to white male persons violated the Equal
Protection Clause. In holding the law unconstitutional, the Court
was careful to note that the question before it was not whether "a
colored man ... has a right to a... jury composed in whole or in
part of persons of his own race or color."2 9 Rather, the issue was
whether all members of his race may be excluded from considera-
tion at the outset by an express piece of legislation. This
distinction defined the demarcation between constitutionality and
unconstitutionality-and was the beginning of ajurisprudence that
looked not at the result of the state action, but rather at what atti-
tude was expressed by the state action. The Equal Protection Clause
provided a positive right, which the Court considered most valu-
able to the "colored race," to "exemption from unfriendly
legislation against them distinctively as colored,-exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the
security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and
discriminations which are steps towards reducing them to the con-
dition of a subject race."3 0 The Court then explained exactly what
the Equal Protection Clause proscribes and why:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and ex-
pressly denied by a statute all right to participate in the
administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color,
though they are citizens, and may be in other respects fully
qualified, is practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law,
an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that race
prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals
of the race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to
all others.3
28. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
29. Id. at 305.
30. Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
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The constitutional infirmity is caused by the state's act of sin-
gling out a particular racial group for exclusion. The suggestion is
that singling out of this sort sends a message that the state consid-
ers members of the group inferior. That message then acts as a
stimulus to racial prejudice. In Strauder, then, the Court defined
discrimination to include protection from certain messages sent by
a state's legislation.
Twenty years later, in one of the Court's most ignoble opinions,
the Court again considered the constitutionality of state legislation
that accorded people different treatment based upon race. In
Plessy v. Ferguson,2 the Court upheld a statute that provided "equal
but separate accommodations for the white, and colored races."
3
In Plessy, the Court did not abandon the inquiry into the message
sent by the state legislation. In several passages, the Court expressly
considered what the statute implied. However, the Court was sim-
ply disingenuous about its conclusions.
[a] statute which implies merely a legal distinction between
the white and colored races-a distinction which is founded
in the color of the two races, and which must always exist so
long as white men are distinguished from the other race by
color-has no tendency to destroy the legal equality of the
two races, or reestablish a state of involuntary servitude.
3 4
The Court here appears to be stating that a message of distinc-
tion based upon race is not sufficient to constitute discrimination
because the distinction does not undermine equality. The Court
went on to say that "[1]aws permitting, and even requiring, [the]
separation [of the two races] ... do not necessarily imply the infe-
riority of either race to the other."35 Rejecting the plaintiff's
argument that "the enforced separation of the two races stamps
the colored race with a badge of inferiority," the Court made the
infamous statement that "[i] f this be so, it is not by reason of any-
thing found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it."
3 6
While using language that suggests that it considered the mes-
sage sent by the statute, the Court neither acknowledged that the
32. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33. Id. at 540.
34. Id. at 543.
35. Id. at 544.
36. Id. at 551. Of course, if the Court had been required to determine whether the
"colored race" was reasonable to put such a construction upon the act, the inquiry would
have had a different result.
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"colored race" reasonably understood the act to be communicat-
ing their inferiority nor addressed how the white majority likely
understood the message conveyed by the act, as the equally well-
known dissent by Justice Harlan articulates. Quoting the language
from Strauder as the controlling precedent, Harlan rebutted the
claim advanced by the majority that the statute at issue was consti-
tutionally sound because it applied equally to whites and blacks
alike. He first noted the impermissible purpose behind the statute:
"Every one knows that the statute in question had its origin in the
purpose, not so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars
occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches oc-
cupied by or assigned to white persons."37 Harlan then stated as an
overriding principle underlying the Equal Protection Clause that a
state may not create a caste system based upon race-or any other
immutable characteristic: "in view of the Constitution, in the eye of
the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class
of citizens.... In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before
the law."
Justice Harlan went on to say that the legislation is constitution-
ally infirm because the statute in question, by proceeding on the
ground that "colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white
citizens," will "arouse race hate [and] create and perpetuate a feel-
ing of distrust between these races." 9 He refers to the separation of
citizens on the basis of race as a "brand of servitude and degrada-
40tion" which is irreconcilable with the equal protection of the law.
This language suggests that Justice Harlan was concerned with
more than the purpose of the legislation (he correctly interpreted
racial hostility as the only likely purpose for such otherwise arbi-
trary separation of people). He was also concerned with the effect
of the message sent by such separation-both upon the whites who
are likely to have their racism fueled by the official sanction sug-
gested by the legislation and upon the blacks who will be degraded
by the message and whose distrust of the majority will be intensi-
fied.
37. Id. at 557 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). While much is laudable about Harlan's dissent,
an almost equal amount of his opinion is as contrary to our current understanding of racial
equality as the majority's opinion. At the same time that he asserted the importance of the
principle of equality before the lawJustice Harlan also assumed continued white hegemony
and affirmed the exclusion of the Chinese from citizenship. Id. at 559, 561.
39. Id. at 560 (Harlan,J. dissenting).
40. Id. at 562 (HarlanJ. dissenting).
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In subsequent Equal Protection cases, without specifying pre-
cisely what standard it is applying, the Court appeared quite
concerned with the purposes underlying racialized legislation as
opposed to the message sent by such legislation. For example, in
Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, though the Court
denied an Equal Protection challenge by black parents to a Geor-
gia county's decision to subsidize a high school for white girls
while not providing any similar subsidy to a high school for black
children, it noted that:
if it appeared that the Board's refusal to maintain such a
school was in fact an abuse of its discretion and in hostility to
the colored population because of their race, different ques-
tions might have arisen in the state court.... The state court
... rejected the suggestion that the Board proceeded in bad
faith or had abused the discretion with which it was invested
by the statute under which it proceeded or had acted in hos-
tility to the colored race.41
This language appears to suggest that a racially hostile purpose
is necessary for a government decision to be constitutionally im-
permissible even though the decision to fund a school for whites
and not for blacks clearly shows racial favoritism. The message
conveyed by such obvious racial favoritism is not mentioned.
B. Challenges to Segregation and the Adoption
of Expressivism in Brown
The case in which the Court made most famous use of the
stigmatic theory of harm underlying an Equal Protection violation
is Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka. 2 As has been detailed
41. 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
42. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). It might have been expected that as the Court began to con-
sider the desegregation cases leading up to Brown the Court would again focus upon the
expressive effect of legislation. However, a line of cases beginning with McCabe v. Atchinson,
235 U.S. 151 (1914), and continuing through Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938), and Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), focused upon the right to equal protec-
tion of the laws as a personal and individual right. While these cases could easily have been
decided using a stigma theory, the Court did not address the effect of the message of exclu-
sion at all and instead concentrated solely upon the opportunities the plaintiff was deprived
of as a result of the exclusionary legislation. It is important to note that in Sweatt, unlike
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the Court rejected formalist syllogisms-the new law
school at issue, which was created for blacks, excluded whites just as the University of Texas
excluded blacks-and recognized the reality of white power in the state; but still, the Court
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elsewhere, 3 plaintiffs sought to place squarely before the Court the
issue of segregation itself and thus stipulated that the schools were
equalized with respect to tangible factors such as buildings,
curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachersi4 In response to
the question of whether segregation of children on the basis of
race even in light of the equality of tangible factors deprived the
children of the minority group of equal protection, the Court
stated that such segregation "generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."45 This finding focused
specifically upon the recipient's response to the message: it does
not refer to the response of the white children or the larger
community. The Court then quoted the district court stating that
"the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the negro group," which the court
found has the effect of limiting educational achievement and thus
opportunity.4 6 This language as well suggests that the relevant
inquiry is the perception of those in the "negro" group, since it
describes the effect of the message as resulting in limited
educational opportunity. Based in large part upon its conclusion
that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits the stigmatic message
conveyed to African Americans by the segregation of the races, the
Court held that, in the field of public education, the doctrine of
"separate but equal" has no place.
Over the next two years, in per curiam opinions without any
analysis, the Court also held that segregation was impermissible in
limited its analysis to opportunities of individuals and did not address the larger social
meaning of excluding blacks from the state's primary law school.
The University of Oklahoma's treatment of Hugh McLaurin, which led to McLaurin v.
Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950), was an even more obvious opportu-
nity for the Court to focus upon the message sent by state action. In that case, Mr.
McLaurin, after being admitted to the University of Oklahoma pursuant to court order, was
required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom; to sit at a
designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the library, but not to use the desks in the regu-
lar reading room; and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time from the
other students in the school cafeteria. Id. at 640. But again, instead of considering the sym-
bolic message conveyed by this treatment to either Mr. McLaurin or society generally, the
Court focused more narrowly upon the effect of such treatment upon Mr. McLaurin's edu-
cation.
43. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDU-
CATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY, (1975); MARK TUSHNET, BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE BATTLE FOR INTEGRATION (1995).
44. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
45. Id. at 494.
46. Id.
WINTR 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
41 48various facets of life, including buses, municipal golf courses,
and public beaches and bathhouses.4 Thus, the Court appears to
have applied stigmatic harm theory as developed in the Brown de-
cision to any instance in which government expressly segregated
the races. Similarly, in the educational desegregation cases follow-
ing Brown, the Court often mentioned the stigmatic harm to
African American school children as an impetus for finding vari-
ous desegregation proposals constitutionally inadequate.0
In applying stigmatic harm theory outside the education con-
text, the Court also addressed the effect of the message upon those
outside the African American community. For example, in Ander-
son v. Martin,' in which it invalidated a Louisiana statute requiring
that a candidate's race be designated on the ballot, the Court was
concerned that the statute "furnishe[d] a vehicle by which racial
prejudice may be so aroused as to operate against one group be-
cause of race and for another" in light of the message the
requirement conveys. 52 "[B]y directing the citizen's attention to the
single consideration of race or color, the State indicates that a
candidate's race or color is an important-perhaps paramount-
consideration in the citizen's choice, which may decisively influ-
ence the citizen to cast his ballot along racial lines.
5 3
47. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
48. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
49. Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955). In this case, the Court af-
firmed a decision by the Fourth Circuit holding segregation of recreational facilities
unconstitutional in reliance upon the language in Brown concerning the feeling of inferior-
ity generated by separating black children from white children of the same age solely
because of race. The Court also reversed and remanded numerous cases addressing segre-
gation in light of Brwn, including, Muirv. Louisville Park, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
50. See, e.g., Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 466 (1972).
51. 375 U.S. 399, 402 (1964). Another example is Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene
County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). In Carter, plaintiffs were a class of African American citizens of
Greene County, Alabama, who alleged that they had been systematically excluded from jury
service within the county solely on the basis of race. Alabama's jury selection procedure was
governed by statute and provided that a clerk must compile a list of eligible citizens which
will be used by the three-memberjury commission to prepare ajury roll and box containing
the names of all qualified citizens who are "generally reputed to be honest and intelligent
and are esteemed in the community for their integrity, good character and sound judg-
ment." Id. at 323 (quoting 30 ALA. CODE § 21 (1958)). African Americans composed 75% of
the population in Greene County in 1960; however, the application of this statute in Greene
County resulted in African Americans comprising only (at most) 7% of the persons on the
jury list between 1951 through 1967. In holding such practice unconstitutional, the Court
quoted Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), for the proposition that "[t]he exclu-
sion of Negroes from jury service because of their race is 'practically a brand upon them
... an assertion of their inferiority.. ' Id. at 330 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 308 (1879)) (ellipses in original).
52. 375 U.S. at 402.
53. Id.
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While many cases invalidating racial classifications appeared to
have been decided because of the stigma resulting from such clas-
sifications, the Court continued to focus upon the racially
discriminatory purpose of such legislation as well. In Anderson, for
example, the Court noted that the legislation could not be justified
by the state's assertion that it was "reasonably designed to meet le-
gitimate governmental interests in informing the electorate as to
candidates," since the Court could "see no relevance in the State's
pointing up the race of the candidate as bearing upon his qualifi-
cations for office."54 Instead, "this factor in itself 'underscores the
purely racial character and purpose' of the statute., 5  In Loving v.
Virginia,6 the racial purpose appeared to be the primary factor the
Court relied upon in invalidating Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statute.57 The Court rejected the "equal application" theory ad-
vanced by the State, in which the State argued that the statute
could not be said to discriminate because the statute penalized
whites and non-whites alike for intermarrying, claiming that the
fact of the racial classification alone requires scrutiny. The Court
then held that the statute did not survive strict scrutiny because
"[t] here is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent
of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.
The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving
white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain
White Supremacy. 5 8 The Court in Loving did not mention the
stigmatic message sent by the statute, but instead relied upon the
purpose the statute appeared to promote.
C. Ascendance of the Intent Test
During this same post-Brown period, the Court began to grapple
with how to determine the constitutionality of government action
with racially discriminatory effects, as opposed to racially explicit
legislation. The Court appeared to reject a "purpose test" and to
adopt an "effects test" in Palmer v. Thompson, only to reverse itself
54. Id. at 403.
55. Id. (quoting Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963)).
56. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Id. at 11-12.
58. Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
59. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
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five years later in Washington v. Davis.60 These cases have been ana-
lyzed in many articles addressing the Court's Equal Protection
Clause jurisprudence; 6' however, they have not been analyzed for
their implicit abandonment of a stigmatic or expressive harm test.
In Palmer, plaintiffs challenged the decision of the city of Jack-
son, Mississippi to close all city-operated swimming pools following
a court decision requiring the pools to be integrated. Rejecting
plaintiffs' argument that the City's actions violated the Equal Pro-
tection Clause because they were motivated by a desire to avoid
racial integration, the Court held that "no case in this Court has
held that a legislative act may violate equal protection solely be-
cause of the motivations of the men who voted for it."62 The Court
distinguished cases in which motive or purpose had been discussed
as being primarily focused upon the "actual effect of the enact-
ments, not upon the motivation which led the States to behave as
they did."6 The Court stated that it found no facts in the case to
suggest that blacks and whites were being treated differently and
thus, no constitutional violation.64 The Palmer majority also men-
tions briefly the "faint and unpersuasive argument" that the closing
of the pools to keep the races separate constituted a violation of
the Thirteenth Amendment as a badge or incident of slavery-
analogized to an argument made by Justice Harlan in his dissent in
Plessy.
65
Like the Plessy majority, the majority in Palmer chose to ignore
the quite clear message sent by the City's decision. The dissents,
however, did not. Justice White unmasked the majority's attempt to
"white wash" the message of the City ofJackson's actions: "The fact
is that closing the pools is an expression of official policy that Ne-
groes are unfit to associate with whites.... The Equal Protection
Clause is a hollow promise if it does not forbid such official deni-
60. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
61. See, e.g. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARv. L. REv. 713, 738
n.46 (1983) (citing Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. Rev. 95; John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Eric Schnapper, Perpetuation of
Past Discrimination, 96 HARv. L. REv. 828 (1983); Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Govern-
mental Actions: A Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041 (1978); and Seth F. Kreimer, Note, Reading the Mind of the School
Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De jure Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317 (1976)); Robert
Hayman, The Color of Tradition: Critical Race Theory and Postmodern Constitutional Traditional-
ism, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 57, 86 n.152 (1995); Andrew Luger, Liberal Theory as
Constitutional Doctrine: A CriticalApproach to Equal Protection, 73 GEO. L.J. 153 (1984).
62. 403 U.S. at 224.
63. Id. at 225.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 226.
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grations of the race the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
protect."66 White also argued that the responses of whites and
blacks to the decision to close the pools would differ and that the
difference is of constitutional significance:
[T]he reality is that the impact of the city's act falls on the
minority. Quite apart from the question whether the white
citizens of Jackson have a better chance to swim than do their
Negro neighbors absent city pools, there are deep and trou-
bling effects on the racial minority that should give us all
pause. As stated at the outset of this opinion, by closing the
pools solely because of the order to desegregate, the city is
expressing its official view that Negroes are so inferior that
they are unfit to share with whites this particular type of pub-
lic facility.
67
Justice White then pressed his view that Brown and its progeny
prohibited official endorsement of the notion that Negroes are not
equal to whites. He concludes that, while whites will be angered
by the loss of the pools, "Negroes feel that and more. They are
stigmatized by official implementation of a policy that the Four-
teenth Amendment condemns as illegal. And the closed pools
stand as mute reminders to the community of the official view of
Negro inferiority."69
The deficiency in Palmer is the majority's insistence that only ef-
fect (and a truncated view of effect) is constitutionally relevant;
purpose and message are considered to be of no significance. In-
terestingly, though, while the majority quite ably attacked the
pitfalls of a purpose test, the majority never addressed the stig-
matic harm test the Court had been applying, as articulated by
Justice White's dissent. When five years later in Washington v.
Davis70 the Court adopted the purpose test it had appeared to re-
ject in Palmer, Justice White wrote for the majority.
Washington v. Davis involved an Equal Protection challenge to a
qualifying test administered to applicants for positions as police
officers in Washington D.C. that excluded a disproportionately
high number of African Americans.7' Plaintiffs did not claim that
66. Id. at 241 (White,J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 266 (White,J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 267 (White,J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 268 (White,J, dissenting).
70. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
71. Id. at 233.
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there was intentional or purposeful discrimination, but only that
the test bore no relationship to job performance, and had a highly
discriminatory impact in screening out black applicants. 72 The
Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals had erroneously
applied the standard devised in Title VII cases.73 Justice White's
majority opinion expressly rejected a rule under which disparate
impact alone is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny. Justice White
cited Strauder for the proposition that, while exclusion of
"Negroes" from juries violates the Equal Protection Clause, the fact
that a particular jury does not statistically reflect the community
does not itself constitute a violation. 75 He then quoted Akins v.
Texas 6 for the proposition that "[a] purpose to discriminate" must
be present to find a constitutional violation for systematic
exclusion of jurymen.77 Justice White went on to discuss Wright v.
781Rockefeller, involving a claim that district lines had been racially
gerrymandered, in which plaintiffs did not prevail because they
failed to show that the gerrymandering "was either motivated by
racial considerations or in fact drew the districts on racial lines."
79
White also claimed that the school desegregation cases adhered to
the principle that the invidious quality of law must be traced to a
racially discriminatory purpose.s° Disproportionate impact may be
relevant to finding discriminatory purpose, and may even be so
dramatic as to constitute a prima facie case, but White held that
disproportionate impact is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination-" [s] tanding alone, it does not trigger the
rule that racial classifications are to be subjected to the strictest
scrutiny."' White acknowledged that Palmer and Wright suggested
otherwise but claimed they do so only in dicta; 2 he then
72. Id.
73. Id. at 238.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 239.
76. 325 U.S. 398, 403-404 (1945).
77. Washington, 426 U.S. at 239.
78. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
79. Washington, 426 U.S. at 240.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 242 (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 242-43.Justice White also ignored the fact that Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960), had been described by the Court as standing "not for the proposition that legis-
lative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable
effect of a statute on its face may render it unconstitutional." United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 384-85 (1968) (quoted in John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in
ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE LJ. 1205, 1210 (1970)).
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proceeded to critique the application of an impact test to the facts
of the case.8
Apart from his selective use of precedent, White's only explana-
tion for the inappropriateness of an impact test is the oft-quoted
line:
[a] rule that a statute designed to serve neutral ends is never-
theless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it
benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far
reaching and would raise serious questions about, and per-
haps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burden-
some to the poor and to the average black than to the more
affluent white s4
Justice Stevens' concurrence suggests that the demarcation
between discriminatory purpose and impact is not "nearly as
bright, and perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the
Court's opinion might assume." s,8 Stevens claimed that the effect of
the government's action will continue to be the focus of the court's
inquiry because "normally the actor is presumed to have intended
the natural consequence of his deeds."' Stevens contended that
the subjective state of mind of any actor-but particularly when
the government is the actor-is largely unknowable since the
"governmental action ... is frequently the product of compromise,
of collective decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation."87
83. 426 U.S. at 245-48. Justice White first questioned how a race neutral qualification
that happens to result in the members of one racial group failing more than another could
possibly be a violation of the Equal Protection clause. Id. at 245. The Constitution cannot
prevent government from modestly upgrading communicative ability of employees when a
job requires special ability to communicate orally and in writing (ignoring the fact that the
test had not been validated). Id. at 246. He then claimed that the level of disproportionality
was not significant enough to suggest that the test was a purposeful device to discriminate,
and that the test is neutral on its face and is rationally related to the reasonable goal of gov-
ernment. Id. at 247. Justice White found that in this case, the government's affirmative
efforts to recruit blacks negated any inference of discriminatory intent. Id.
84. Davis, 426 U.S. at 248. While not cited, this explanation mirrors the argument
John Hart Ely set forth in his influential Yale Law Journal article published in 1970. As ex-
amples of "laws which fall most heavily on one racial group from which it would be difficult
to infer racial motivation", Ely mentions "tax breaks for farmers and oilmen, sales taxes,
graduated income taxes, literacy tests, and perhaps certain criminal statutes." John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1254 & n. 140
(1970).
85. Davis, 426 U.S. at 254 (Stevens,J., concurring).
86. Id. at 253 (Stevens,J., concurring).
87. Id.
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Therefore, Stevens acknowledged that it is "unrealistic ... to
require the victim of alleged discrimination to uncover the actual
subjective intent of the decisionmaker," and noted that by the
same token, a "law conscripting clerics should not be invalidated
because an atheist voted for it."""
Stewart repudiated this vision of intent the following term in
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney.s9 Rejecting the notion that the ac-
tor intends the natural and foreseeable consequences of his
voluntary actions, Stewart stated "'[d]iscriminatory purpose' ...
implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of con-
sequences. It implies that the decision-maker ... selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."90 None of the Justices in either Feeney, or Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,9' the other case
that term in which the Court addressed the application of the
Equal Protection Clause to facially neutral government actions,
mentioned the stigmatic harm theory. That strand of analysis,
which had run through the Equal Protection cases beginning with
Strauder, was simply abandoned without discussion.
D. The Limitations of Intent
It is widely agreed that the operative purpose of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is to ensure that government actors treat citizens
88. Id. Only Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the opinion. What is ex-
traordinarily curious is that the dissent never mentions the fact that the Court had rejected
the impact standard and adopted a purpose standard-in direct contravention of Palmer-
which has had an enormous impact. The dissent focused exclusively upon the narrow and
very technical question of whether the test at issue is properly validated and the fact that it is
inconsistent with EEOC regulations. 426 U.S. at 256 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
89. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
90. Id. at 279 (citation omitted). In dissent, Justices Marshall and Brennan attempted
to resuscitate the forseeability interpretation of the purpose test but were unsuccessful. Id.
at 281 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
91. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington Heights, the Court held that the following factors
are relevant to determining whether an official action was motivated by a discriminatory
purpose: "(1) the impact of the official action and whether it bears more heavily on one
race than another; (2) the historical background of the decision, especially if it 'reveals a
series of official actions taken for invidious purposes;' (3) the sequence of events preceding
the decision; (4) any departures, substantive or procedural, from the normal decision mak-
ing process; and (5) the legislative or administrative history, specifically contemporaneous
statements, minutes of meetings, or reports." Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remedying Environ-
mental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REv. 394, 409 (1991) (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-
68).
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with equal concern and respect regardless of racial group. The in-
tent test has failed in this task. The intent test requires the trial
judge to discern the state of mind of the relevant government offi-
cial or officials. In order for the plaintiff to prevail, the trial judge
must conclude that the government official took the contested ac-
tion at least in part because of her racial animus. After Feeney, it is
not enough for the plaintiff to show that the government actor
took the contested action with the knowledge that it would harm a
particular group, the plaintiff must show that the official took the
action because the action would have adverse effects upon the sus-
pect group. In other words, the plaintiff must prove to the judge's
satisfaction that the government official was motivated by the views
of an old-fashioned bigot. This standard has been soundly and
convincingly critiqued by numerous legal scholars as too harsh a
standard in an era in which racism has gone underground.93
A primary reason that the intent standard has become such a
roadblock for plaintiffs is that, contrary to Stevens' concurrence in
Washington v. Davis, intent has not been construed in the Equal
Protection context to mean that the government actor "intended"
the natural and knowable consequences of her actions. If intent
were so interpreted (as it is in the tort context94), government ac-
tion that resulted in a substantially disproportionate impact would
generally be sufficient to prove intent.95 Instead, the trial judge
must attempt to discern something much more difficult: what spe-
cifically a government official was thinking when she made a
96certain decision or cast a certain vote.
92. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 260.
93. See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1065 (1998); Haney
L6pez, supra note 4, at 1830; Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term Forward: Equal
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1977); Charles R. Lawrence
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv.
317 (1987); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279 (1997).
94. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, 48 (2000). A defendant has intent if
she either "has a purpose to accomplish that result, or... lacks such a purpose but knows to
a substantial certainty that the defendant's actions will bring about the result."
95. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 272.
96. Id. But see, Daniel Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1105
(1989). Ortiz argues that the Court has not in fact required that plaintiffs meet such a high
standard for intent in all cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause, but rather has
reserved this standard for challenges to government actions that do not implicate funda-
mental rights. Ortiz makes a convincing argument that the Court sometimes applies a less
stringent standard even when the intent test purportedly applies. However, that conclusion
is itself problematic since it suggests that judges are exercising undisclosed discretion as to
when to apply the harsh standard. See Foster, supra note 93, at 1068.
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Such an inquiry thus focuses the trial judge's attention upon the
information the government official possessed, the statements that
she made, the actions that she took, and any other evidence rele-
vant to her intentions. Any evidence concerning the history of the
plaintiffs' treatment by the government, if not by that same gov-
ernment actor, and the plaintiffs' perceptions of their treatment by
the government is largely irrelevant since it does not directly ad-
dress the defendant government's intent. The current intent
standard dismisses the plaintiffs' experience; instead it requires the
trial judge to stand in the shoes of the government actor to assess
whether any motivation apart from racial animus might have ex-
isted. Indeed, under the Feeney "because of' not "in spite of'
standard, the trial judge is also essentially directed to inquire
whether there are any plausible non-racist explanations for the ac-
tion taken. Because government decisions tend to be the products
of complex and multi-faceted planning and review, it is rare indeed
for there not to be a single non-racistjustification for a decision or
action.
Moreover, even if the racial explanations may be more persua-
sive, the process of standing in the government actor's shoes may
well lead to what cognitive theorists call perspective-taking empa-
thy.9' Empathy is the process of "understanding the experience or
situation of another, both affectively and cognitively, often
achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other.
9 8
The substantive result advanced by encouraging empathy with
government defendants seems to be a disincentive to find for
plaintiffs in Equal Protection cases unless the most virulent racism
is present that even an empathetic judge cannot ignore.99 If one
views the Equal Protection Clause as intended to eradicate selec-
tive indifference or lack of equal concern and respect by
government actors, the empathy encouraged will have a perverse
effect. First, given the equality norms currently espoused, if not
followed, by our society, most judges will be extremely reticent to
conclude that a government actor with whom he has been invited
97. See, e.g., BECKY LYNN OMDAHL, COGNITIVE APPRAISAL, EMOTION, AND EMPATHY,
17-20, 227-28 (1995).
98. Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1579 (1987).
99. Sheldon Nahmod has critiqued the Supreme Court's decision in qualified immu-
nity jurisprudence on these grounds. Sheldon Nahmod, The Restructuring of Narrative and
Empathy in Section 1983 Cases, 72 CHt.-KENT L. REV. 819, 820 (1997). Nahmod argues that by
requiring judges to determine whether a section 1983 defendant has acted reasonably the
judge must read the defendant's narrative and "imagin[e] what it was like when she acted as
she did under the circumstances confronting her." Id. at 828-29. He contends that such
narratives "encourage empathy and mercy for the § 1983 tort defendant in connection with
the potential for significant personal damages liability." Id. at 829.
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to empathize is a racist. As Kenneth Karst has argued: "Think
about who most of the judges are, and then ask yourself, in which
direction is judicial empathy likely to flow in these disputed-
motives cases: to those who are claiming discrimination, or to the
officials whose motives are challenged."'00 Second, a government
actor is essentially given the message that the only conduct she
must avoid is open racism; she need not vigilantly guard against
the more unconscious forms of racism that she is in fact more
likely to engage in.""
In any event, the government official in present day Equal Pro-
tection cases is unlikely to be of the old fashioned George Wallace
variety.0 2 Powerful social norms ensure that such blatant racism is
no longer tolerated.'0 ' However, the virtual elimination of the viru-
lent prejudice of a different age does not mean that those in the
majority group no longer take race into account in decision mak-
ing. In 1987, Charles Lawrence described the phenomenon of
unconscious racism in his article: The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protec-
tion: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism.0 4 During the last decade,
two well-known social scientists, John F Dovidio and Samuel L.
Gaertner, have documented a modern form of bias they refer to as
"aversive racism," which describes the practice of acting upon un-
conscious negative feelings by those who believe themselves to be
non-racist. 5 It has certainly been my experience representing
100. Kenneth Karst, Judging and Belonging, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1957, 1961 (1988). Slightly
less cynically, jon powell has suggested that "subtle and unconscious forms of racist behav-
ior, because of their ephemeral nature, are often purposefully overlooked. No one wants to
accuse another of being racist if it is at once clear that the person's behavior is uncon-
scious." jon powell, As Justice Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of Harmful Speech in Democratic
Society, 16 LAW & INEQ. 97, 127-28 (1998).
101. SeeHaney L6pez, supra note 4.
102. Wallace, an infamous segregationist, is most noted for his virulent efforts to pre-
vent the University of Alabama from admitting blacks. See TODD GITLIN, THE SIXTIES: YEARS
OF HOPE, DAYS OF RAGE, 136, 144 (1987).
103. The Trent Lott debacle in December 2002 illustrates that the public will not toler-
ate blatantly racist statements by modern-day politicians. When the media publicized Lott's
statement that the country would have been better off if Strom Thurmond had been elected
President in 1948-on a platform that supported segregation-Lott was forced to resign as
Senate majority leader. See Carl Hulse, Lott Apologizes Again on Words about '48 Race, N.Y.
TIMES, December 12, 2002, at Al. However, while numerous studies document the dramatic
shift from blatant racism to public expression of egalitarian values, a more subtle form of
racism continues to operate "to the detriment of women and minorities." Green, supra note
1,95-96.
104. Lawrence, supra note 93.
105. Green, supra note 1, at 96 (citing to the works of John F. Dovido and Samuel L.
Gaertner, including: John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, Changes in the Expression and
Assessment of Racial Prjudice, in OPENING DOORS: PERSPECTIVES ON RACE RELATIONS IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 119 (HarryJ. Knope et al. eds., 1991);John F. Dovidio & Samuel
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communities in civil rights law suits that the most likely defendant
is a harried bureaucrat or elected official who views the world from
her own class and race position and thus engages in selective indif-
ference rather than out-and-out racism. She is generally very upset
and feels unjustly maligned by the suggestion that she is racist and,
if the case goes to trial, can convincingly testify that racial animus
never entered her mind when she made the challenged decision.
Thus, during the same period that the Court imposed a legal
standard requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose, ra-
cism went underground. This confluence, not surprisingly, has led
to the extraordinary lack of success that people of color have had
in bringing suit against governmental actions that they argue have
harmed them disproportionately."6
II. ExPREssIVE HARM AND THE OBJECTIVE
OBSERVER STANDARD
A decade after intent replaced both an impact and an expressive
harm standard in the Equal Protection context, expressive harm
theory resurfaced. In both the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence and in Equal Protection Clause challenges to
majority-minority districts and affirmative action plans, Justice
O'Connor has applied expressive reasoning. Following its re-
emergence in the Courts, scholars have developed an extensive
literature exploring the application of expressivist theory.
L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of
Aversive Racism, in CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3 (Jennifer L.
Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998); and John E Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, The
Effects of Race, Status, and Ability on Helping Behavior, 44 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 192 (1981)).
106. See, e.g.,JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.4 (3d
ed. 1999). Rotunda and Nowak thoroughly explore the Supreme Court's treatment of statis-
tics in disparate impact cases and show that while litigation based primarily on statistics has
been successful in discrete areas such as the Voting Rights Act, the discriminatory intent
requirement of the Court's Equal Protection doctrine is likely to defeat most Equal Protec-
tion challenges where plaintiffs cannot produce a smoking gun of intentional
discrimination. In addition, as noted in the introduction, prior to the 2000 term, many
plaintiffs chose to bring discrimination claims under Title VI and its implementing regula-
tions which allowed them to proceed under a disparate impact theory.
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A. The Re-emergence of Expressive Harm
Theory in the Courts
In Lynch v. Donnelly,10 7justice O'Connor suggested clarifying the
oft-criticized test for Establishment Clause inquiry set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman1° with what has been called the endorsement
test. In Lemon, the Court created a test that synthesized the criteria
developed by the Court over many years: "First, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, fi-
nally, the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion."' "
Justice O'Connor examined the purpose and effect prongs of
the Lemon test, explaining that "[t] he purpose prong of the Lemon
test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or dis-
approve of religion" while the effect prong asks whether
"irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under
review in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.""0
She concluded that "[a]n affirmative answer to either question
should render the challenged practice invalid.""' However, Justice
O'Connor critiqued the traditional understanding of each prong
and argued that they should be replaced by an endorsement test.
Justice O'Connor noted that the purpose prong has been
deemed satisfied if a government activity has a secular purpose, but
she argued that the "mere existence of some secular purpose,
however dominated by religious purposes" does not satisfy this
prong. 1 Rather, she claimed the inquiry should be "whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or dis-
approval of religion.""1
3
More importantly, Justice O'Connor explained that the focus of
the effects test should not be whether the government practice "in
fact causes, even as a primary effect, advancement or inhibition of
107. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
108. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
109. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-613 (citations and internal quotation omitted). In Washing-
ton v. Davis, Justice White cited the first prong of the Lemon test to support the proposition
that purpose is relevant to the Establishment Clause inquiry. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). Justice
White's reliance on an Establishment Clause case suggests that the Court has long recog-
nized the obvious parallels between the goals of the Establishment clause and those of the
Equal Protection clause.
110. 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 691 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
113. Id.
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religion, ' 14 citing cases upholding tax exemptions for religious
organizations, and mandatory Sunday closing laws. 5 Rather, she ar-
gued, "[w]hat is crucial is that a government practice not have the
effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or
public perception, to status in the political community."' 6 The ultimate
inquiry of Justice O'Connor's endorsement (or disapproval) test is
whether the government action "sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community.""
7
What Justice O'Connor means here is that the endorsement test
does not invalidate every government act or decision that may as-
sist religions, such as a tax exemption for religious organizations
or Sunday closing laws which allow members of some, but not all,
religions to observe their Sabbath more easily. Instead, Justice
O'Connor states, the endorsement test invalidates those govern-
ment actions that create the appearance that some religions or
religious groups are disfavored or favored. Justice O'Connor re-
fined and expanded upon her endorsement test in a series of
concurring opinions following Lynch."" And, while Lemon was still
cited as the operative test, Justice O'Connor's endorsement lan-
guage from Lynch was adopted by the majority of the Court in
Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe. "9
Shortly after Justice O'Connor introduced expressive theory in
the Establishment Clause context, she reintroduced it in the con-
text of white challenges to race specific government action that
purported to benefit minorities. 12 0 In Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
114. Id. at 691-92 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
115. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420 (1961); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952)).
116. Id. at 692 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 688 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
118. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 67 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 772 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
119. 530 U.S. 290, 309 (2000). "School sponsorship of a religious message is impermis-
sible because it sends the ancillary message to members of the audience who are
nonadherants [sic] 'that they are outsiders ..... '" Id. at 309-10 (Quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
688 (1984) (O'ConnorJ. concurring)).
120. City of Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). While it is impor-
tant for my argument that the Court is again applying expressive harm theory in its Equal
Protection jurisprudence, I do not necessarily agree with the Court's decisions in the con-
text of what has been called the benign use of race. Rather, I agree with Mary Ann Case that
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, which recognizes that government may
recognize religion without violating the Establishment Clause, may support a broader rec-
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the Court invalidated a set-aside program established by the City of
Richmond to benefit minority construction contractors on the
ground that classifications based upon race "threaten to stigmatize
individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group and to
incite racial hostility.' 21 Justice O'Connor has also used expressive
theory to explain the constitutional infirmity in the creation of ma-
jority-minority voting districts.2 2 Indeed, the term expressive harm
was coined by Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi in an article ex-
plaining Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Shaw v. Reno, in which
the Court invalidated a majority-minority district on the ground
that its "bizarre" shape made clear that race was the primary pur-
pose behind its creation.1
2
3
In the voting cases, plaintiffs are not challenging a racial classifi-
cation since the actual action of creating a voting district is race
neutral. In these cases, the Court has couched the inquiry in the
language of intent, asking whether a discriminatory purpose ani-
mated the drawing of district lines. 24 In determining whether the
intent test is met, however, Justice O'Connor has used the lan-
guage of expressive theory:
[R] eapportionment is one area in which appearances do mat-
ter. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district
individuals who belong to the same race, but who are other-
wise widely separate by geographical and political boundaries,
and who may have little in common with one another but the
color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to
political apartheid.
2 5
She went on to argue that it sends a pernicious message to
elected representatives, suggesting that they are obligated to repre-
sent only one racial group.126
ognition of race. See MARY ANN CASE, LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
FROM THE PAST OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES? (Chicago Public Law and Legal Theory Working
Paper No. 11, 2001). Similarly, Deborah Hellman, who has written most extensively to date
on the application of expressivist theory to the Equal Protection Clause, has argued against
the assumption that expressivist theory precludes the use of race to empower racial minori-
ties. Hellman,Judging by Appearances, supra note 13, at 685.
121. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
122. Id. at 648; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
123. Richard Pildes and Richard Niemi, Expressive Harms, Bizarre Districts and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances after Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993).
124. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646.
125. Id. at 647
126. Id.
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B. The Theory of Expressivism
Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes have set forth a "re-
statement" of expressivist theories of law.1 27 They posit that the
legality of an actors' conduct is dependent upon whether that
conduct "expresses appropriate attitudes toward various substan-
tive values.' 2s Actions that convey attitudes that are contrary to
accepted norms constitute "expressive harms." 129 Like the cases de-
scribed in Part I, this theory is based upon the idea that
stigmatizing messages result in concrete harms to people as mem-
bers of the polity.
An expression is an action, statement, or any other expressive
vehicle that manifests a state of mind.3 0 The state of mind can be
cognitive-beliefs, ideas or theories-but can also include "moods,
emotions, attitudes, desires, intentions, and personality traits. '
Expression can also take place at the level of state action, where
policies and deliberative principles can be interpreted as "express-
ing official state beliefs and attitudes.' ' 132 The role of expression is
to bring a state of mind into the open for others to recognize and
interpret.3 3 A particular action, statement or other vehicle may be
more or less successful in conveying the state of mind of the ac-
t~o134
tor.13
127. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 13, at 1503. While Anderson, Pildes, and Niemi
should be credited for their work in the resurgence of expressivism, in 1987 Charles Law-
rence set forth what he termed a 'cultural meaning' test. Lawrence, supra note 93. Lawrence
argued that governmental conduct should be evaluated to see if it "conveys a symbolic mes-
sage to which the culture attaches racial significance." Id. at 324. Heightened scrutiny would
apply if a significant proportion of the population would think of the government action in
racial terms. Id. However, Lawrence proposed the cultural meaning test as a "proxy for the
unconscious motivation of the decisionmaker"-a mechanism to uncover instances of un-
conscious but still intentional racism that the standard application of the purpose test would
overlook. Id. at 379 & n.293. Because he continues to assume that intent is dispositive-even
if unconscious-his test differs fundamentally from expressive theory. This difference is
most evident in Lawrence's willingness to require the dominant group's interpretation of
the cultural meaning of a government action to be dispositive. Id. at 379 n.293. Lawrence
states that he is not entirely comfortable with this solution, and acknowledges that there
may be instances in which the "minority subculture may well see the dominant culture more
clearly than the dominant culture sees itself." Id. I agree with Lawrence's latter point and
posit that the ultimate goal of the Equal Protection Clause is for government to have to
familiarize itself with how its actions are perceived by minority communities.
128. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 13, at 1504.
129. Id. at 1511.
130. Id. at 1504.
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Despite the link between expression and the state of mind of the
actor, an action, statement, or other expressive vehicle may express
a state of mind without being caused by that state of mind. 5 An
example is musicians who play music that expresses the state of
mind of sadness without feeling sad themselves and lawmakers who
deny blacks the right to vote, which expresses contempt for them
even though the lawmakers do not themselves feel that contempt
but are merely pandering to white voters. 36 The operative refer-
ence for determining expressive meaning is the state of mind
expressed by a particular statement or action, not the particular
state of mind of the actor who made the statement or action.
The primary concern of an expressivist theory of law is whether
the performance of a particular act conveys an attitude toward per-
sons that is inconsistent with a legally prescribed norm.137 Adopting
an expressivist approach would "regulate actions by regulating the
acceptable justifications for doing them" because it requires peo-
ple to "act in accordance with norms that express the right
attitudes toward persons.'' 3 8 An expressive theory of rights and
equality law asserts that state action must express equal concern
and respect 3 9 toward people and must also express an understand-
ing of all citizens as equal members of the state despite racial,
ethnic, or religious differences.14 An expressive harm thus occurs
when a person is treated in a way that expresses that she is not an
equal member of the state or is not entitled to equal concern and
respect. 141
135. Id. at 1508.
136. Id. Anderson and Pildes state that communication of a state of mind can only occur
from a deliberate attempt to inform others of ones state of mind. Id. at 1508. They note,
however, that expression of state of mind occurs independently of intent and whenever an
action is taken. Id.
137. It thus is neither purely consequentialist, because it does not approve of any
means toward a desirable end nor purely deontological, because it is not devoid of concerns
for the ultimate ends of the act but rather requires consideration of consequences (we can-
not express right attitudes toward people if we ignore the consequences of our actions
toward them). Id. at 1509, 1512.
138. Id. at 1511-12.
139. Id. at 1520 n.30 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 14).
140. Id. at 1518.
141. A communicative harm is a special class of expressive harms in which a person is
intentionally subjected to negative or inappropriate attitudes by another. Id. The difference
between the two is that an expressive harm need not be the result of an intentional act while
a communicative harm by definition is intended. Id. at 1528. Anderson and Pildes focus
their discussion of expressive harm theory as applied to the Equal Protection Clause upon
cases in which there is a racial classification or in which race consciousness can be inferred.
However, they also acknowledge throughout their Article that expressivism holds govern-
ment accountable when a government action conveys a stigmatic message even if such a
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C. Expressive Harms and Heightened Scrutiny
By design, the expressive harm test focuses attention on the
message rather than the intention. The goal, then, is to determine
if, by virtue of its message, a government practice has the effect-
even unintentionally-of making race relevant to status in the po-
litical community. If the Equal Protection Clause has any meaning,
it would seem to be that race should not lower one's status as a
member of the polity.
42
Similarly, there does not seem to be a coherent explanation for
why government action that unintentionally causes such an effect
to a member (or non-member) of a religious group should be an
Establishment Clause violation, but that only when such actions
are intentional should there be an Equal Protection Clause viola-
tion.143 The only explanation the Court gives in Washington v. Davis
to explain the centrality of intent is the overinclusiveness of a pure
disparate impact test. 14  However, an expressive harm test responds
to the overinclusiveness problem. Just as Justice O'Connor con-
cludes that a law providing for tax exemptions for religious
organizations is not invalid simply because it advances religion, so
too, a toll or sales tax that requires members of racial groups that
are disproportionately poor to pay a higher percentage of their
income need not be considered invalid. So long as the toll or sales
tax does not send a message that there are insiders or outsiders in
the political community based upon their race, the toll or sales tax
would be valid.
John Hart Ely has advanced the argument that courts should not
interfere with decisions reached according to democratic proc-
esses unless there is reason to distrust the process.' 45 Discriminatory
motivation is an improper basis for decisionmaking and thus con-
stitutes a justification for courts to interfere with democratic
decisions. However, if one accepts that it is now aversive or uncon-
scious racial bias that distorts decisionmaking, then the search for
message was unintended. Id. at 1546. In addition, they note their disagreement with the
Court's application of its discriminatory purpose test. Id. at 1541 n.90.
142. See, e.g., The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (stating that
the "evil to be remedied by the [Equal Protection Clause]" was "the existence of laws ...
which discriminated with gross injustice and hardship against [the newly emancipated Ne-
groes] as a class").
143. Scholars have noted Justice O'Connor's implicitly similar approach to religious,
racial, and gender based differences. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 10, 49 (1987).
144. 426 U.S. at 248.
145. Ely, supra note 84, at 1210.
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conscious discriminatory motivation is too narrow. Expressivism
provides a mechanism for uncovering unconscious bias. As Justice
O'Connor points out, a democratic process that results in actions
that send the message to one segment of the community that it is
less valued is also flawed and should be closely scrutinized by
courts.
4 6
D. Discerning an Expressive Harm: Expectations of Universality
It is critical to define the attitude or state of mind that is actually
expressed by a given statement or act. What people (or groups)141
intend to express should not be dispositive since the intention may
deviate from what they in fact express. People may act negligently
or thoughtlessly and be unaware of how others may construe their
actions; they may be unaware of social conventions or norms by
which the public determines attitude or they may have uncon-
scious attitudes or biases that motivate their conduct.
148
Expressivism holds people accountable for the "public" rather
than the private meaning of their actions.
49
Anderson and Pildes argue that public or expressive meanings
of actions are social constructs that are not defined by those who
engage in the acts, the recipients of the acts, or even the general
public. 5" The meanings "are a result of the ways in which actions
fit with (or fail to fit with) other meaningful norms and practices
in the community.., they have to be recognizable by it, if people
146. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
147. Anderson and Pildes argue that individuals and groups are equally capable of ex-
pressing a particular idea, belief or attitude. Anderson and Pildes, supra note 13, at 1514-15,
1519. If all individual members of a group express a particular idea then the group is also
expressing that idea as a reflection of the shared beliefs of the group's membership. This
group belief informs group decision-making as to particular courses of action and further
informs group attitudes. Because groups are capable of expressing attitudes, then they
should be held to the same moral and rational principles as individuals. Collectives should
therefore be required to express the right attitudes towards people. Id. at 1514-19. Ander-
son and Pildes discuss collective action only in terms of universal agreement. Under their
approach, it seems as though if the bulk of a group expresses an idea, then the group as a
whole expresses that idea-despite the fact that some members of the group failed to express
the idea, or may have outright denied it. Id. at 1518. This approach presumes that the group
has some mechanism for aggregating preferences. Some groups will not; however, because
the focus of this article is government action, this distinction is not salient.
148. Id. at 1512-13.
149. Id. at 1512.
150. Id. at 1523-24.
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were to exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny.",1 To determine
these meanings, they try to fit them into "an interpretive con-
text.
, 112
The Court has adopted a universalist objective observer test.
53
Justice O'Connor describes the test as whether "an objective ob-
server, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and
implementation of the [relevant government action], would per-
ceive it as a state endorsement." 54 She describes the objective
observer as similar to the "reasonable person" in tort law who is a
"personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, de-
termined by the [collective] social judgment.' 5 The objective
observer should be "deemed aware of the history and context of
the community and forum in which the religious display ap-
pears. " 1 6 Anderson and Pildes appear generally to applaud a
universalist objective observer test because, "the constitutionality
of state laws cannot be held hostage to observer's subjective feel-
ings."'
157
However, a universalist objective observer test will fail the goal of
ensuring the government treats persons with equal concern and
respect. The universalist objective observer test, by definition, pre-
sumes that there is a meaning of an action that is not dependent
upon the particular perspective of the person assessing the mean-
ing.58 The racial perspective of the person assessing the meaning
will often affect how that person reads the meaning of the action.
Therefore, the effect of the universalist objective observer standard
will be to reify the majority group's read of a contested action and
further to alienate members of the minority community. Such a
result only exacerbates the constitutional injury that constitutional
expressivism is intended to address.
Anderson and Pildes recognize that there may be a variety of
meanings emanating from a single action when they differentiate
151. Id. at 1525.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1546-48. See also Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). In
Sante Fe Independent School District, Justice Stevens appears to have abandoned his quest for a
reasonable observer test particularly focusing upon a "reasonable observer who may not
share the particular religious belief[s]" the state action allegedly expresses. Capitol Square
Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799 (1995) (Stevens,J. dissenting).
154. Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
155. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 779-780 (quoting w. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
156. Id. at 780.
157. Anderson and Pildes, supra note 13, at 1547.
158. See Minow, supra note 143, at 32 ("Although a person's perspective does not col-
lapse into his or her demographic characteristics, no one is free from perspective, and no
one can see fully from another's point of view.").
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between the intended meaning of an act and the public meaning
of an act.'59 They give as an example of this distinction the white
man who, while checking into a hotel, drops his keys into the
hands of the first black man he sees at the door. 'i The black man
is insulted despite the white man's sincere protests that he did not
intend any offense."" It is unclear, however, whether Anderson and
Pildes recognize that it may not be possible to discern the "public"
meaning of such an incident without adopting a specific perspec-
tive. They appear to credit the black man's view that the action
conveyed a message of racial indignity. 62 I would as well. For a
white man to assume that any black man standing near a hotel en-
trance is a valet suggests a stereotyped view of black men as
servants rather than fellow businessmen. Therefore, the action ex-
pressed that stigmatizing message. However, it is easy to imagine
other whites thinking that the incident was simply an honest mis-
take made by a harried traveler and that the black man was being
overly sensitive. How would a "universalist" objective observer
faced with two or more interpretations of what the white man's
actions expressed credibly choose between them?
Anderson and Pildes also address the contingency of meaning
when they argue that the recipients of the message do not control
its meaning any more than the senders do. 163 They use the Su-
preme Court's decision in Memphis v. Greene 4 to illustrate this
point. The case involves an Equal Protection challenge to a deci-
sion by the city of Memphis to erect a barrier preventing any traffic
into a residential cul de sac. The majority, while acknowledging
that the plaintiffs are black and the beneficiaries of the traffic bar-
rier are white, paints a race-neutral picture of homeowners seeking
only to protect the "safety and tranquility of a residential
neighborhood" by preventing "undesirable traffic." 165 Justice Mar-
shall's dissent shows a very different image. He quotes the trial
court's conclusion that the case was about an "all white neighbor-
hood ... seeking to stop the traffic from an overwhelmingly black
neighborhood from coming through their street." 66 Justice Mar-
shall focuses upon the "symbolic message" of the barrier, which an





164. 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
165. 451 U.S. at 115, 119.
166. Id. at 137 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
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expert stated will serve as a "monument to racial hostility.''1 7 By
acknowledging that the recipients of the government's actions
viewed the action as racially charged while the majority of the
Court did not, Anderson and Pildes acknowledge the contingency
of meaning. 68 They do not address, however, the fact that the ra-
cial perspective of the observer may have been the determinant of
how the government's action was read.' 69 This case dramatically
illustrates the flaws of an objective observer standard.7 Clearly,
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, did not view himself as en-
gaging in a selective misreading of the facts. However, this case
demonstrates the differences in perception that may occur when
the same facts are viewed from an outsider-as opposed to in-
sider-perspective.
The shortcomings of an objective observer standard have been
raised by scholars generally, and particularly by critics of the
standard employed by Justice O'Connor.' Neal Feigenson relies
upon contemporary philosophers of language for the argument
that there is no set of "objective meaning[s]" for a particular
government act. 172 Rather, different audiences will impose different
meanings upon the same act depending upon their particular
167. Id. at 138, 140 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
168. Anderson and Pildes, supra note 13, at 1507.
169. This does not mean that a white person would necessarily read the action one way
and a black person another. The fact thatJustice Brennan signed Justice Marshall's concur-
rence is surely evidence of that. Rather, it means that the point of view from which the
action is read (here, the black residents of Memphis or the white majority) and the facts
relevant to that determination (the history of dejure segregation or simply the minutes of
the zoning meaning) will be determinative.
170. Interestingly, Lawrence describes Memphis v. Greene as "almost as easy as Brown."
Lawrence, supra note 93, at 363. He claims that the construction of the wall clearly signified
whites' "need to separate themselves from blacks as a symbol of their superiority" and then
states that if we ask "even the most self-deluded among [the members of the city council]
what the residents of Memphis would take the existence of the wall to mean, the obvious
answer would be difficult to avoid." Id. at 357-58. However, the fact that the majority of the
Court and respected scholars such as Anderson and Pildes read the case differently suggests
that Lawrence's assumptions about the universality of cultural meanings may be incorrect.
See Anderson and Pildes, supra note 13, at 1524.
171. See, e.g., Rena M. Bila, The Establishment Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for Re-
ligion in Public Education, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1535 (1995); Jesse H. Choper, Religion and Race
Under the Constitution: Similarities and Differences, 79 CORNELL L. Rxv. 491 (1994); BarbaraJ.
Flagg, The Algebra of Pluralism: Subjective Experience as a Constitutional Variable, 47 VAND. L.
REv. 273 (1994); Stephen G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL.
L. REv. 463 (1994); Stephen G. Gey, Why Religion is Special?: Reconsidering the Accomodation of
Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Prr. L. REv. 75 (1990); Hell-
man, The Expressive Dimension, supra note 13; Shari Seidman Diamond & Andrew
Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REv. 713 (2001).
172. Neal Feigenson, Political Standing and Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alter-
native to Current Establishment Clause Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 53, 85-86 (1990).
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beliefs and understandings.17 Steven Smith has remarked that
expressivists are essentially evoking a premodern metaphysics
when they assert that an objective meaning is possible. 7 , Smith
challenges O'Connor's objective observer test in the Establishment
Clause cases claiming that the cultural meaning of a government
act that concerns religion is likely to be ambiguous and contested
between those with different substantive visions of the role of
religion in society.75 Indeed, Smith argues, the process of
concluding that a particular act has a universal meaning is itself
anathema if the goal of the Establishment Clause is to recognize a
plurality of views. 76 Andrew Koppelman and Shari Seidman
Diamond expand upon Smith's argument by claiming that the
objective observer standard may well exacerbate the alienation the
endorsement test ostensibly intends to redress since 'Jews may be
offended by a state-sponsored nativity display, but at least the
display does not subject plaintiffs to a lecture, as some of Justice
O'Connor's opinions do, expressing why they are unreasonable to
feel offended!"
7
Evoking a "universalist" objective observer standard in the Equal
Protection context will ensure that this phenomenon occurs
between those with different racial perspectives as well. Referring
back to the misidentification of the African-American businessman
described earlier, one can imagine that after learning of his
mistake, the white guest uttered sincere protests that he did not
intend to be insulting. The black businessman may well believe this
is so, but he will likely assume a degree of unconscious racial bias
was present that caused the reflexive misidentification. The white
guest may well think that the black man is being overly sensitive
and should not be so miffed by such a minor incident. Were the
white businessman to be misidentified as a valet, he may think it a
funny anecdote to share. The difference in the reaction is not that
this particular black man is simply more sensitive. In other words,
the men do not just have different "subjective" reactions to the
same incident. Rather, they belong to different "intepretive
173. Id.
174. Steven D. Smith, ExpressivistJurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L.
REv. 506, 554 (2001).
175. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality
and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 322-23 (1987).
176. Id.
177. Seidman Diamond & Koppelman, supra note 171, at 724.
178. See Minow, supra note 143, at 72-78. Martha Minow, and many others, have long
argued that the Court has unselfconsciously adopted a racial perspective that harms others.
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communities"1 79 for purposes of this action. '80 Unlike the black
man, the white man does not belong to a group with a history and
experience of being demeaned and kept in subservient roles as a
result of his race. Whether the white man's actions will be taken to
express contempt or a stereotyped view of black men is utterly
dependant upon whether that history is taken into account.
Thus, if the "objective" observer is more likely than not to be a
member of the dominant interpretive community, the risk is that
the objective observer standard will privilege that dominant view. If
the black man is then informed by an "objective observer" that a
reasonable person would not consider the white man's assumption
that he was a valet a racial insult but merely an honest mistake, the
black man will undoubtedly be doubly offended. He has felt in-
sulted by the white guest's conduct and now he is being labeled
unreasonable for taking offense.
Other scholars urging the adoption of an expressive harm test
have recognized flaws in the pure objective observer standard and
have proposed alternatives."' Deborah Hellman posits that the
public meaning of a state action should be assessed according to
Jfirgen Habermas' conception of the ideal conversation in which
the judge seeks to ascertain what meaning would emerge from a
conversation under fair conditions among real people with differ-
ent views. 8 2 She suggests that the judge should use the litigation
process to approximate an ideal conversation in which parties
would come together to discuss the question under fair conditions
in which "all are equally able to contribute to the discussion and
179. See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989). Fish uses the phrase "inter-
pretive community" to rebut the claim that perception is indeterminate. Id. at 83. To the
contrary, he claims there is no entirely subjective interpretation because "the observer is
always a product of the categories of understanding that are his by virtue of his membership
in a community of interpretation." Id. This article's use of the term "interpretive commu-
nity" is similar to Kenneth Karst's term "communities of meaning." In his commentJudging
and Belonging, Karst argues that those who have been acculturated in different environments
inhabit different communities of meaning which do not just produce different points of
view but "different realities, different worlds." Karst, supra note 100.
180. The men may well be part of the same interpretive community at another point in
time. If, for example, one of the men tells a female co-worker that her dress shows off her
great body, she may be quite offended. Both men may agree that she is being overly prissy.
The men then will be in the same interpretive community vis-a-vis the female co-worker
although they are in different interpretive communities with respect to race.
181. Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension, supra note 13; Jerry Kang, Negative Ac-
tion Against Asian Americans: The Internal Instability of Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1996) ; Seidman Diamond and Koppleman, supra note 171.
182. Hellman, The Expressive Dimension, supra note 13.
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all are committed to hearing and learning from the views of oth-
ers.
,,83
While Hellman's proposal responds to the same concerns this ar-
ticle addresses, Hellman's "dialogic" solution does not satisfy the
critiques of the objective observer standard. Indeed, Habermas'
method has been criticized for assuming that the end result of his
ideal conversation will be a universal meaning that transcends dif-
ferent perspectives. 1 4 Richard Rorty, for example, rejects Habermas'
conclusion that there will be a "transcendent moment of universal
validity which will burst every provinciality asunder."1 85 Instead, Rorty
responds that to refer to the end product of the ideal conversation
as the universal meaning will simply mask the continuing diversity of
meaning that initially necessitated the conversation. 8 6 Hellman's
adoption of Habermas suffers from a similar flaw. There is unlikely
to be consensus at the end of the litigation process. Thus, the
meaning deemed "objective" by the court will be imposed upon
the parties by the court. In addition, if the judge is directed to find
the "objective" meaning of the government action, even if he lis-
tens with an open mind to the views of others (which judges
should do in any case), he will likely find most persuasive those
187views that cohere with his own perspective.
In a wide-ranging article critiquing Ronald Dworkin's vision of
equality, Jerry Kang proposes a "banned meaning" conception of
equality that closely resembles expressive harm theory.88 Kang ar-
gues that the Equal Protection Clause provides a "right not to
suffer disadvantage from a governmental practice that conveys an
objective social meaning of stigma.". 9 In his discussion of how to
interpret the social meaning of a government action, Kang ac-
knowledges that the social meaning of a government practice can
never be "neutrally, clinically, or uncontroversially gleaned."
190
However, Kang's solution suffers from the same defects as Hell-
man's dialogic solution. He argues that the court should be
required to look at the practice from the perspective of each party
to the litigation and then weigh the competing perspectives against
183. Id. at 23. Hellman is adopting this method from JORGEN HABERMAS, MORAL CON-
SCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (Christian Lenhardt & Shierry Weber Nicholsen
trans., MIT Press 1990).
184. RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY, 66-67 (1989).
185. Id. at 68.
186. Id. at 67-68.
187. See Karst, supra note 100.
188. Kang, supra note 181, at 23.
189. Id. at 24.
190. Id. at 25.
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one another. 9' During this weighing process, the court should "test
[the various social meanings] for blindspots, insensitivities, and
oversensitivities. ' '192 Kang fails, however, to prescribe which view
should ultimately prevail, relying on the court to decide.93 Appar-
ently, Kang has more faith than I thatjudges will not without more
guidance simply favor the perspective most like their own.
III. REASSERTING EXPRESSIVE HARM THEORY
Building upon Justice O'Connor's Establishment Clause juris-
prudence, facially neutral government actions should be judged
according to expressive standards of harm. As other expressivist
scholars have argued, a race neutral government action that ex-
presses a lack of concern and respect for one racial group should
be subject to heightened scrutiny, even if that expression is unin-
tended. For the reasons argued in Part II, however, the universalist
objective observer standard adopted by the Court (and applauded
by Anderson and Pildes), as well as the alternatives advanced by
Hellman and Kang, are inadequate to ensure that the constitu-
tional harm is discerned. Instead, I suggest a "reasonable
community member" standard, in which the government action
would be examined from the perspective of a reasonable member
of the affected or allegedly harmed community. This standard
would require the judge to consider the actions of the government
from the perspective of a member of the allegedly affected com-
munity to determine whether, with the information possessed by
such a person and the community's experience of treatment by the
government, such a person would reasonably conclude that the
government's action "express[es] contempt, hostility, or inappro-
priate paternalism toward racial, ethnic, gender, and certain other
groups" at issue "constitute [s] them as social inferiors or as a stig-
matized or pariah class, '' 94 or suggests that they are worthy of less
concern and respect than the majority group.
191. Id. at 26.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 13, at 1503.
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A. A Reasonable Community Member
Standard and Empathy
An expressive harm test that requires the court to determine the
expressive content of the government action by discerning how a
reasonable member of the allegedly affected community would
view the action will invite the judge to empathize with the affected
community-to attempt to view the government's actions from the
affected community's perspective. Judicial empathy can be a pow-
erful tool to ensure a more complete judicial understanding so
long as it is directed toward the appropriate substantive ends. If
expressive theory is intended to ensure the appearance of govern-
mental fairness,1 95 it is most important to determine whether the
government action is seen as fair from the perspective of the
community affected by the action. In addition, directing ajudge to
empathize with the affected community will be a step toward en-
suring that the judge's own perspective-or his own unconscious
bias-does not influence his own determination of the message.""'
This latter phenomenon is illustrated by Lynne Henderson's
discussion of the Supreme Court's use of empathy in deciding
Brown. 9 Henderson observes that the content of the opinion
shows a "recognition of human experience and pain-of feeling"
in the famous phrase: "'To separate [school children] from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race gener-
ates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be un-
done.' ' s Henderson also describes, however, the different
Justices' grappling with the issue of whether to reverse Plessy and
order desegregation. 9 9 Justice Reed apparently was most resistant
to the notion that "'segregation was ... an act of discrimina-
tion.' ,200 His resistence stemmed from his discomfort that "'a nigra
[sic] can walk into a restaurant at the Mayflower Hotel and sit
195. In Judging by Appearances, Deborah Hellman provides a fuller treatment of the phi-
losophical implications of focusing upon the appearances of government actions without
regard to the consequences of those actions. Hellman, The Expressive Dimension, supra note
13, at 655-68.
196. Martha Minow has written extensively on the dangers of assuming that judges are
objective, instead of subjective. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 143, at 33.
197. Henderson, supra note 98, at 1592-1606.
198. Id. at 1594 (quoting Brown, 374 U.S. at 494) (emphasis omitted).
199. Id. at 1602-1606.
200. Id. at 1606 (quoting KLUGER, supra note 43, at 595).
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down... right next to Mrs. Reed.' ,,20' Henderson posits thatJustice
Reed was able to empathize with a white southerner's desire for
segregation because of his own desire to keep his wife in a segre-
gated environment but "couldn't imagine the discomfort caused
the black by being excluded."20 2 Henderson suggests that Justice
Reed was finally swayed by Chief Justice Warren's arguments that
"defenders of Plessy were white supremacists" and the disastrous
consequences of a dissent.
203
While the foregoing is a dramatic example that hopefully does
not reflect views held by any current member of the judiciary,
judges are, like everyone else, likely to be influenced by uncon-
scious racial bias. °4 Studies suggest that such unconscious racial
bias can be controlled, but is unlikely to be if decision makers are
unaware of its effect.20 5 Specifically, decision-makers who are not
required to "articulate the reasons for their decisions" are more
apt to be influenced by discriminatory bias.0 6 Judges articulate rea-
sons for their decisions in the form of written opinions. However,
only if judges are directed to empathize with the affected commu-
nity will they be required to differentiate between their own
perceptions of the government actions and those of a member of a
racial group about whom they may have unconscious bias. Indeed,
as Justice Reed's example suggests, absent a directive, judges may
207have difficulty empathizing with another group. Cognitive theory
suggests that empathetic responses are generally more likely when
there is an incentive for understanding. 8 Only a standard ex-
pressly requiring the judge to engage in empathy may help to
overcome unconscious racism, particularly when unconscious ra-
cism stands as a roadblock to that empathy.
201. Id. at 1607 (quoting KLUGER, supra note 43, at 595).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1606.
204. Haney L6pez, supra note 4, at 1819. Haney L6pez examines unconscious racial
bias among judges in the context of two cases in which Mexican-American defendants ad-
vanced Equal Protection arguments to challenge their indictments by all-white grand juries.
His article sets out a theory of racism that "reconcil[es] the statistical evidence of judicial
discrimination with the judges' insistence that they never intended to discriminate." Id. at
1722.
205. Green, supra note 1, at 104-08.
206. Id.
207. Minnow, supra note 143, at 51-54, 60-63.
208. Henderson, supra note 98, at 1584.
209. Empathetic responses are less likely if "the one in distress is not seen as a human
or like oneself." Henderson, supra note 98, at 1586 (citing Hoffman, The Development of Em-
pathy, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY AND DEVELOPMENTAL
PERSPECTIVES 57-58 (J. Ruston & R. Sorrentino eds. 1981)).
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Even without the specter of actual bias in judges' decisions, the
reasonable community member standard is necessary to prevent
the reification of the point of view of the predominantly white
male judiciary. A universalist objective observer standard presumes
that it is possible to view the world without a lens created by any
particular race, class, or gender perspective. However, social sci-
ence data and most of our experience suggests that this
presumption is mistaken, that people do in fact generally view the
world-and particularly charged situations-from the perspective
of their race, class, and gender.21° Judges so far have not escaped
this propensity."' As a result, accepting the universalist observer
standard will define as objective the perspective of the judge and
impose that perspective upon the plaintiffs.212 We would all like to
believe that our judicial system is able to rise above the individual
biases and prejudices of its individual members. Ironically, the best
way to approximate this ideal impartiality is a more frank recogni-
tion of the real differences in perspective that judges, like all
humans, possess.
To the extent that the Equal Protection Clause has been con-
strued to have as its purpose the elimination of disparities caused
by race, but not other conditions such as poverty,213 the expressive
210. Green, supra note 1, at 96-99 (discussing the wealth of social science data con-
cerning the existence of modern racism and its effect upon decision making). It has
become commonplace in academic discourse to "talk of the partiality-or inevitably inter-
pretive nature-of all of the 'discourses,' 'paradigms,' or 'lenses' through which we make
sense of our human world, and in turn constitute ourselves." Lucie E. White, Seeking "... the
Faces of Otherness . .. ": A Response to Professors Sarat, Festiner and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1499, 1500 (1992). See Hellman, The Expressive Dimension, supra note 13 (referring to the
different reactions of many whites and African-Americans to the O.J. Simpson acquittal and
noting that there are instances when different groups may interpret the same event in radi-
cally different ways as a result of their different experiences in the world).
211. LINDA G. MILLS, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE: UNRAVELING BIAS IN JUDICIAL DE-
CISION MAKING (1990). Hellman also describes the necessary "partiality" of a judge's
individual perspective and the impossibility of achieving a "view from nowhere." Hellman,
supra note 13, at 21.
212. Cf Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: the Ideology of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1211 (1990). In this article, Professor
Ehrenreich discusses the reasonable person standard in the context of a sexual harassment
case and finds that the court by "[rielying on apparently neutral constructs to resolve the
group conflict in the case ... obscures the fact that its ruling actually enforces (and rein-
forces) a particular, identifiable perspective-that of upperclass men." Id. See also Kathryn
Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the "Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1203 (1989) ("Because most judges are men, who have experienced the traditional
forms of male socialization, their instinctive reaction is to embrace the perspective of the
employer.... If Title VII is to be a useful tool in combatting sexual harassment, courts must
recognize that there is another perspective from which it is possible, in fact necessary, to
view these activities.").
213. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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harm test using a reasonable community member perspective
should also solve the problem of overinclusiveness that bedevils
the pure disparate impact test. Even an action that has a disparate
impact must be found to suggest that a particular racial group is
214less worthy of concern and respect than the majority group.
Therefore, the average sales tax or bridge toll with a disparate im-
pact will not be subject to successful challenge because the purely
economic disparate impact does not express government animus
or indifference to members of minority groups.215
B. Perspectival Difference and the Possibility of Objectivity
While I am arguing against an objective observer standard for
discerning whether an expressive harm exists, I am not arguing
that objectivity itself is impossible. If, as some have argued, law is
wholly indeterminate and any judicial decision reflects nothing
more than the personal preferences of those empowered to judge,
it would be futile to propose an alternative standard.216 Instead, by
proposing a reasonable community member standard I am seeking
to bring Equal Protection Clause decisions closer to some form of
objectivity. Obviously I am not referring to the sort of metaphysical
objectivity that has been largely discredited in both philosophy and
law.217 Rather, I propose the level of objectivity that Owen Fiss de-
214. DwoRKIN, supra note 14, at 190.
215. It is possible to imagine a scenario in which a bridge toll does carry a racial mes-
sage. Consider, for example, a community that is divided by a bridge. As one section of the
community becomes predominantly minority, the cost of the toll going from the minority to
the white part of town continues to rise until it becomes economically difficult for many
minorities to enter that part of the city. Under these circumstances, the toll might be read
to symbolize the separation of the two sides of town and the desire of the white section to
exclude the minority section. Cf Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 137-138 (1981).
216. See, e.g. Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 373, 378-84, 394-96,
399-402 (1982) (arguing that objectivity, even in a limited sense, is impossible); but see
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 744 (1982) [hereinafter
Fiss, Objectivity] (arguing that a degree of objectivity is possible even though the judge will
play some role in giving meaning to texts); Owen M. Fiss, What is Feminism? 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
413, 424 (1994) (critiquing Catharine MacKinnon's mockery of objectivity on the ground
that the denial of objectivity is inconsistent with MacKinnon's affirmation of equality-if
gender hierarchy is to be condemned on the ground that it offends equality than she is
treating equality as having objective value).
217. Metaphysical or ontological objectivity is generally understood as corresponding
to an external reality. See, e.g. RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 7 (1990).
For a legal judgment to be objective in this sense seems to require a conclusion that there is
a single answer to a particular legal dispute that is mandated by an external force-such as a
statute or the Constitution. See Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 216, at 742. Fiss notes that some
provisions of the Constitution meet this standard such as the provision requiring the Presi-
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scribes as "transcend[ing] the particular vantage point of the per-
son offering the interpretation" 2 s I will call this degree of
objectivity "adjudicative objectivity.
2 1
Adjudicative objectivity will be difficult, if not impossible, to at-
tain in cases involving racial classifications brought under the
Equal Protection Clause due to the deep societal divisions as to the
role of race in society and the role of government in responding to
the problem of race.2 0 Because judges themselves are mired in
these divisions, their decisions on cases with similar facts will dif-
fer according to where on the spectrum they fall. However, with
regard to race-neutral government actions, I would hope that
there is general societal consensus that government should pro-
vide equal concern and respect to its citizens regardless of race,
and that government should not act in such a way that creates an
dent to be at least 35 years old. Id. However, Fiss argues that the Equal Protection Clause is
too general and too comprehensive to ever meet such a demanding standard. Id.
218. Fiss, Objectivity, supra note 216, at 743.
219. This level of objectivity is often attainable in "easy" cases in which clear legal
precedent corresponds to the facts of a given case. An example is if a statute prescribes a 2
year statute of limitations to bring an action for tort and the plaintiff brings the action 2
years and 6 months from a car accident. It is hard to imagine that such a case would be
decided differently by different judges. However, it is also often the case that such cases are
rarely brought or settle quickly if they are. Posner, supra note 217, at 7. Posner describes this
type of objectivity as a finding that is "replicable ... if different investigators, not sharing the
same ideological or other preconceptions ... would be bound to agree with it." Id. Posner
provides a third degree of objectivity: "conversational objectivity" which is "not willful, not
personal, not (narrowly) political, not utterly indeterminate though not determinate in the
ontological or scientific sense, but as amenable to and accompanied by persuasive though
not necessarily convincing explanation". Id. at 7. Posner suggests that this degree of objec-
tivity is often readily attainable but that it is so weak as to not be meaningful. Stanley Fish, in
reviewing Posner's degrees of objectivity, argues that conversational objectivity is replicable
depending upon "the relevant community, the relation of available argumentative resources
to skillfull advocates, the pressures for generating a conclusion in one direction or another,
the routes by which that decision might be reached, and innumerable other contingencies
that may or may not meet together in happy conjunction." Stanley Fish, Almost Pragmatism:
Richard Posner'sJurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1447, 1448 (1990) (emphasis in original).
220. See generally AMY GUTMAN & ANTHONY APPIAH, COLOR CONSCIOUS (1994). In sepa-
rate essays within the book, philosophers Gutman and Appiah address the complex history
of race and racism in the United States. Appiah argues first that "race" is a construct with no
biological reality but with a social reality created by those seeking to maintain white hegem-
ony. Id. at 69-74, 76-80. Appiah argues that the idea of race should be rejected by those
who seek to eliminate racism, but acknowledges that perceptions of one's race is socially
salient. Id. at 80-81. Gutman addresses the color blind theories of government, and though
she too rejects the idea of race, she argues that "color consciousness" continues to be neces-
sary to respond to existing racism and the disparities between people society considers to be
of different races. Id. at 173-78.
221. As an example of the wildly divergent ways in which Supreme CourtJustices view
government's use of race, compare the majority decisions in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630
(1993) with the dissents, id. at 659 (White,J., dissenting), id. at 676 (Blackmun dissenting),
id. (Stevens dissenting), and id. at 679 (Souter dissenting).
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insider and an outsider group based upon race. When either can
be shown, I would also hope that there would be societal consen-
sus that government actions should be subject to heightened
scrutiny. What remains is to find a method for ascertaining when
these conditions are met that achieves adjudicative objectivity.
The universalist objective observer standard fails precisely be-
cause it ignores the likelihood of perspectival difference. By not
recognizing that membership in different interpretive communi-
ties is likely to result in different interpretations of the same
action, whomever is empowered to act as the objective observer
will likely assume that his own interpretation is objective. This
means that the perspective of the particular judge-or on appel-
late review the majority of judges-will by fiat determine the
objective standard. By contrast, if judges are required to take per-
spectival difference into account and directed that the reasonable
perspective of the affected community should prevail if there is a
difference in interpretation, judgments are less likely to be de-
pendant upon the specific views of the judge.223 In addition, this
standard provides a greater degree of transparency. Instead of
wordlessly elevating the perspective of the judge to the status of
"objective" while relegating any opposing interpretation to the
realm of "subjective," the reasonable community standard com-
municates outright that, when measuring whether government
222. John Rawls' conception of objectivity has been criticized on similar grounds. See,
e.g., Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in LegalJudgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187, 1222 (1994).
Rawls considers a political or moral conviction objective if "reasonable and rational persons,
who are sufficiently intelligent and conscientious in exercising their powers of practical
reason, and whose reasoning exhibits none of the familiar defects of reasoning, would even-
tually endorse those convictions, or significantly narrow their differences about them,
provided that these persons know the relevant facts and have sufficiently surveyed the
grounds that bear on the matter under conditions favorable to due reflection." JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 119 (1993). Feldman is interested in whether it is possible to
render an objective judgment upon a legal concept such as negligence, fraud, or rape,
which are by their very nature constituted by our "practices, goals, values, and beliefs."
Feldman, 92 MICH. L. REv. at 1188. She calls these concepts "blend concepts." Id. Feldman
argues that Rawls' "monologic" conception of objectivity necessarily falls when applied to
blend concepts because it will not "reflect the intersubjective evaluations of merit implicit"
in the definition of a blend concept. Id. at 1223. Rawl's conception cannot reflect the exis-
tence of multiple views of value because "no single individual is likely to be aware of and
sensitive to all the relevant conventional mores, cultural ideas, community values, and cus-
toms that world-guide a particular blend concept. Users of the concept are likely to vary in
their knowledge of and sensitivity to such information, depending upon how they are situ-
ated within the culture." Id. at 1224.
223. See Minow, supra note 143, at 45. Minow argues against abstract universalism on
the ground that it hides unstated reference points and suggests that "[m]aking explicit the
unstated points of reference is the first step in addressing this problem; the next is challeng-
ing the presumed neutrality of the observer who in fact sees from an unacknowledged
perspective." Id.
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action creates an insider or an outsider class based upon race (or
religion), the view of the outsider group prevails.
Of course, the opposite could also be true: one could achieve
the same degree of adjudicative objectivity and transparency by
preferring the reading of the majority group. This, however, would
be highly counter-productive. If the goal of the Equal Protection
Clause is to eliminate the perception that there is an insider and
an outsider class, then preferring the interpretation of the alleg-
edly insider class would obviously frustrate that function.
C. Ordinary Reader of a Particular Race
and the Reasonable Woman Standard
In several different contexts, courts have adopted a "reasonable
member of a particular community" standard.24 The two closest
corollaries are the "ordinary reader of a specific race" standard
some courts have used in determining whether an advertisement
violates the Fair Housing Act and the "reasonable woman" stan-
225dard in employment law.
In Ragin v. The New York Times Co.,226 the Second Circuit held that
section 3404(c) of the Fair Housing Act (which prohibits adver-
tisements that indicate a racial preference) is violated if the ad
would be read by an ordinary reader to "discourage an ordinary
reader of a particular race from answering it."22 7 Plaintiffs sued The
New York Times for publishing real estate advertisements featuring
224. In addition to the race and gender contexts described supra, the Supreme Court
has recently adopted the reasonable police officer perspective in determining whether a
police officer is entitled to qualified immunity when sued for violating constitutional rights.
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). The Court has also long construed treaties with
Indian tribes from the perspective of the Native American. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma,
397 U.S. 620, 630-31 (1970). "The Indian Nations did not seek out the United States and
agree upon an exchange of lands in an arm's-length transaction. Rather, treaties were im-
posed upon them and they had no choice but to consent. As a consequence, this Court has
often held that treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as [the Indians] would have
understood them and any doubtful expressions in them should be resolved in the Indians'
favor." Id. at 630-31 (citingJones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899) and Alaska Pacific Fisher-
ies v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
225. A number of courts have adopted the "reasonable woman" standard. See Hurley v.
Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 E3d 95 (3rd Cir. 1999); Newton v. Depart. of Air Force, 85
E3d 595 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us Inc., 132 N.J. 589 (1993); Ellison v. Brady,
924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991); Yates v. Avco Corp. 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987). A smaller
number of courts have rejected the standard. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Officers Ass'n,
51 F3d 591 (5th Cir. 1995); Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993).
226. 923 E2d 995 (2d Cir. 1991).
227. Id. at 1000.
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exclusively white models as residents and the only black models as
custodians. The court held that a trier of fact could find that such
a use of models may indicate a racial preference. The court
stated that "[w] e live in a race-conscious society, and real estate ad-
vertisers seeking the attention of groups that are largely white may
see greater profit in appealing to white consumers in a manner
that consciously or unconsciously discourages non-whites. '" 9 In
addition, the court noted that the claim by the creator of the ad
that he had not noticed the race of the models could be disbe-
lieved or considered "an inadvertent or unconscious expression of
racism.,230
Other courts have not been as direct in concluding that the race
of the recipient of the message is relevant to the court's inquiry.
23 '
While the Seventh Circuit rejected the explicit use of the "ordinary
232African-American" reader, it nonetheless held that the Fair Hous-
ing Act is violated "if an ad ... would discourage an ordinary
reader of a particular [protected group] from answering it. 2 33 The
Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's instruction, which said
that "an ad expresses a preference, limitation, or discrimination if
it would discourage an ordinary reader of a particular race fromanweig _,234 t
answering it. Thus, the court required the determination of
preference to depend upon how an ordinary reader of a particular
race would be affected by the content of the ad.
Some courts have also employed a particularized reasonableness
standard in sexual harassment cases.35 A number of courts have
replaced the reasonable person standard (which itself replaced the
reasonable man standard) with a reasonable woman standard in
order to recognize that women's perceptions of their situation may
be a "product of our nation's long and unfortunate history of sex
discrimination ", 36 and also that men and women "may be vulner-
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1001.
231. See, e.g., U.S. v. Hunter, 459 E2d 205; Iran C. Smith, Comment, Discriminatory Use of
Models in Housing Advertisement: The Ordinary Black Reader Standard 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1521,
1533 (1993) ("Discussion of the race of the ordinary reader is conspicuously absent from
most cases applying the ordinary reader standard to alleged instances of subtle exclusionary
advertising, particularly all-white models cases.").
232. Jancik v. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 44 F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1995).
233. Id. at 556 (quoting Ragin, 923 F.2d at 999-1000).
234. Id.
235. See supra note 225.
236. Washington v. Wanrow, 559 P.2d 548, 558 (Wash. 1977) (quotation omitted).
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able in different ways and offended by different behavior."2 3 7 As the
Sixth Circuit held in Yates v. Avco,""
[i]n a sexual harassment case involving a male supervisor's
harassment of a female subordinate, it seems only reasonable
that the person standing in the shoes of the employee should
be 'the reasonable woman' since the plaintiff in this type of
case is required to be a member of a protected class and is by
definition female.239
The Ninth Circuit explained that, while there is a broad range
of view points among women generally, women tend to have an
incentive to be more concerned about sexual behavior than do
men as a result of women's vulnerability to sexual violence.
2 4
0 Spe-
cifically, the court noted, men may lack an appreciation for "the
social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman
may perceive. 2 4 ' The court held that it adopted a reasonable
woman standard "because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable
person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systemati-
cally ignore the experiences of women."
242
The Supreme Court has continued to refer to the "reasonable
243
person" standard in sexual harassment cases and many commen-
tators debate the efficacy of the reasonable woman standardY.
However, there is a compelling reason for adopting a reasonable
community member standard in the Equal Protection context not
present in the sexual harassment context. Sexual harassment suits
are brought under Title VII and provide access to a jury trial.245
Therefore, the decision as to whether the conduct at issue is offen-
sive will almost certainly include a number of women. By contrast,
the vast majority of suits challenging government action under the
237. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1991); Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 864 E2d 881, 898 (1st Cir. 1988) (male supervisor might believe it legitimate to tell a
female supervisor that she has great figure while that female might find it offensive); Yates v.
Avco, 819 E2d 630, 630 (6th Cir. 1987).
238. 819 F.2d 630.
239. Id. at 636.
240. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 879.
243. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
244. See, e.g., Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists Should Give the Reason-
able Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. GENDER & L. 195 (2001); Elizabeth A.
Schoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does it Matter? 10 AM. UJ. GEN-
DER SOC. POL'Y & L. 633 (2002).
245. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
WINTER 2003]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Equal Protection Clause seek equitable relief and are issues of law
decided by a judge, who is likely to be a white man.246 Because the
fact-finder will be unlikely to include the perspective of anyone in
the affected community, it is more critical that the standard re-
quire the fact-finder to seek and apply that perspective.247
IV. APPLICATION: SYMBOLIC GOVERNMENT ACTS AND
GOVERNMENT ACTS THAT SYMBOLIZE
In order to have a sense of how an expressive harm test with a
reasonable community member standard would function in prac-
tice, Part V will analyze its application in several different contexts.
It will begin with the context that is most like the Establishment
Clause cases: government acts that are strictly symbolic, such as the
flying of the Confederate flag. It will then analyze the application
of an expressive harm test to a decision of the Ohio Highway De-
partment to place sound barriers and landscaping around a
highway as it traverses a white community, but to forego such pro-
tections when the same highway dissects a black community.
Finally, Part V will apply the expressive harm test to a suit brought
by African-American and Hispanic residents of New York City chal-
lenging the New York City Parks Department's decision to close
community gardens and to replace the gardens with housing.
A. The Reasonable Black Citizen and the Confederate Flag
In 1990, Alabama had three flags flying atop the capitol dome
on a single flag pole: the United States flag, the Alabama state flag,
246. See supra Part II.
247. In the context of sexual harassment, women's actions both legally and politically-
and most vividly the Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas incident-have rendered both men and
women more cognizant of sexual dynamics in the workplace. Thus, social expectations may
have caused men and women to be more likely to consider the perspective of women as to
whether given conduct is offensive. In addition, virtually all men have relationships with
women-mothers, sisters, daughters, wives, and others. The same cannot be said with re-
spect to whites and people of color. Sadly, many whites still do not have intimate
relationships with those outside of their racial group. See Haney L6pez, supra note 14, at
1813. While the existence of such relationships between men and women certainly does not
mean that men and women (of the same racial group) view the world from identical per-
spectives, relationships may at least present an opportunity for actual dialogue between men
and women of the same racial group. The relative lack of such relationships between whites
and people of other races means that such opportunities are less frequently present.
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and the Confederate flag.24s The NAACP sued the Governor of
Alabama and other officials claiming that the flying of the Confed-
erate flag atop the capitol dome violated, among other rights, their
members' Equal Protection rights.2 49 The Eleventh Circuit stated
that the state chose initially to raise the flag to commemorate two
occasions: the first was in 1961 reflecting the 100th anniversary of
the Civil War, and the second was the morning of April 25, 1963,
the "day that United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy
travelled to Montgomery to discuss with then-Governor George
Wallace the governor's announced intention to block the admis-
sion of the first black students to the University of Alabama.
"
,5
These were considered two separate reasons why Alabama flies the
flag, and the court held that, because there were two accounts of
why Alabama flies the flag, "it is not certain that the flag was
hoisted for racially discriminatory reasons. 2 5 1 In addition, the
court held "there is no unequal application of the state policy; all
citizens are exposed to the flag. Citizens of all races are offendedS• ,,252th
by its position. Under the intent test then, according to the
Eleventh Circuit, it is constitutional for a state to fly the confeder-
ate flag.2"3
An application of the expressive harm test would proceed quite
differently. First, the inquiry would not be whether there was a dis-
criminatory purpose behind flying the flag. Instead the inquiry
would be whether a state's decision to fly the confederate flag
(1) expresses contempt or hostility toward the racial group at is-
sue, (2) portrays them as social inferiors or as a stigmatized or
pariah group, or (3) suggests that they are worthy of less concern
and respect than the majority group.
248. NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1558.
251. Id. at 1562.
252. Id.
253. But see Robert J. Bein, Stained Fags: Public Symbols and Equal Protection, 28 SETON
HALL L. REV. 897 (1998);James Forman, Jr., note, Driving Dixie Down: Removing the Confeder-
ate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 YALE L.J. 505, 510 (1991). Both Forman and Bein
make a persuasive case that under a careful reading of the intent test, Hunt was wrongly
decided. However, Hunt was not the sole decision to reach the same conclusion. As Hunt
notes, in Augustus v. School Bd. of Escambia County, Fla., 507 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir. 1975), the
Fifth Circuit reversed a district court order enjoining school officials from using the name
"Rebels" for the school's sports teams and from using the confederate flag as a symbol. In
addition, in Coleman v. Miller, 117 F.3d 527 (11th Cir. 1997), the Eleventh Circuit rejected an
Equal Protection challenge to the Georgia flag which incorporates an emblem of the con-
federate battle flag.
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The first source to determine what the flag expresses would be
its history. As James Forman has detailed, the Confederate flag was
designed as a rallying point for Confederate troops who were fight-
ing to secede from the Union, in large part to maintain the slave
regime. 4 In addition, as the Hunt Court acknowledges, the Con-
federate flag was reinvigorated by several states to express symbolic
opposition to court-ordered desegregation of the schools.
255
The second inquiry would concern the flag's current use. In ad-
dition to being flown by several southern states and as a
identification mark by some number of schools in the south, the
flag is also currently used by racial hate groups as a symbol of white
supremacy. It is also often flown at all-white social affairs such as
Confederate balls.
The next question addresses the meaning currently ascribed to
the flag. The Eleventh Circuit recognized in Coleman v. Miller that
the Georgia state flag, which contains the Confederate symbol,
"conveys mixed meanings; to some it honors those who fought in
the Civil War and to others it flies as a symbol of oppression.
25
1
Some consider it a representation of Confederate heritage gener-
ally. James Coleman, one of the plaintiffs who brought suit
challenging states' decisions to fly the flag, testified that the "Con-
federate symbol ... inspires ... fear of violence, causes him to
devalue himself as a person, and sends an exclusionary message to
Georgia's African-American citizens."259 The NAACP in Hunt ar-
gued that because the flag had inspirational power in the
confederate army and was adopted by the Ku Klux Klan, it was a
badge and incident of slavery.2t ° One member of the NAACP testi-
fied that he had difficulty saluting the American flag when the
confederate flag was flying from the same flag pole.
A plaintiff challenging a state's decision to fly the Confederate
flag would thus argue that the decision expressed contempt or
hostility toward her to the extent that it was hoisted to decry
integration. She would claim that, to the extent that the flag
celebrates the southern way of life prior to the civil war, the state is
254. Forman, supra note 253, at 514.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 117 F.3d 527,530 (1997).
258. Id. at 528.
259. Id. at 529.
260. NAACPv. Hunt, 891 F2d 1555, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990). While this was a legal claim
the NAACP sought to raise under the 13th Amendment, it could also be considered an
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celebrating slavery, which was rooted in a view of African
Americans as property and thus the flag has a stigmatizing effect.
Finally, a plaintiff would argue that the decision to fly the flag
knowing that its presence is deeply offensive to African American
citizens suggests that the state lacks equal concern and respect for
African Americans.
The court will then have to determine whether a reasonable
person would agree that the state is sending such a message. One
might think that the answer would be the same under either a uni-
versalist objective observer standard or a reasonable person from
the affected community standard. However, a recent case suggests
that some judges applying an objective observer standard may dis-
agree with plaintiffs' contentions.
In Griffin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,6 1 the plaintiff, a de-
scendant of a Confederate soldier, pursued a First Amendment
challenge to a Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA") regulation
that prohibited the flying of the Confederate flag in a cemetery in
which Confederate soldiers were buried, except on Memorial Day
and Confederate Memorial Day. Plaintiff sought to display a full-
sized, historically accurate Confederate flag from a site called Point
Lookout, which contained a memorial to Confederate soldiers
buried there.263 The VA responded that it had a "compelling inter-
est in avoiding a message of racial intolerance or divisiveness on
federal property" and as such had reasonably exercised its rights to
restrain speech. 64 The district court disagreed that its restrictions
were reasonable. The court held that the flying of the Confederate
flag in an all Confederate cemetery was only a "'shrine[] as a trib-
ute to our gallant dead.' ,,265 As such, and because similar displays
had not resulted in protests, the court held that "one is hard put to
imagine a rationally thinking person attributing a racial or dis-
criminatory message to it. ' '26 This case involved a private individual
262. 129 F. Supp. 2d 832 (D. Md. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 274 E3d 818 (3rd Cir.
2001). The Third Circuit noted:
We agree with the VA that that purpose is to honor, as Americans, in tranquil and
nonpartisan surroundings, those who have given their lives to the Nation. We also
conclude that the Secretary's restrictions are reasonable both as a means of ensuring
the integrity of the VA's own message (which, in this case, coincides with the pur-
pose) and, relatedly, as an effort to maintain the nature of the forum.
274 E 3d 818, 821.
263. 129 E Supp. 2d at 836.
264. Id. at 837.
265. Id. at 841 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 2403(c)) (emphasis added).
266. Id.
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seeking to display the flag in a Confederate cemetery, not a state
choosing to place the Confederate flag on its capitol dome. How-
ever, the fact that a federal judge, in 2001, held that no "rationally
thinking person" could attribute a racially discriminating message
to a full-sized Confederate flag flown on federal property suggests
that some judge applying an objective observer standard may also
conclude that flying the Confederate flag above the state capitol
does not send a discriminatory message.
By contrast, it is almost impossible to conceive that a federal
judge applying the standard of a reasonable person of the affected
community would not conclude that a state decision to fly a
Confederate flag constitutes an Equal Protection violation. If the
judge is directed to view the decision from the perspective of an
African American resident of the state, the testimony of the
plaintiffs has more salience, and the overwhelming political
response from the African American community nationally is
relevant to the inquiry. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit acknowledged
the testimony of Dan Carter, a professor of Southern history at
Emory University, who concluded that the symbolic role of the
Georgia flag was "an attempt to bolster the morale of those
Georgians struggling to maintain white supremacy."2 67 To the
extent that a judge is required to view the flag and the state's
decision to celebrate it as would an African American resident of
the state, the decision seems clear.
B. Wen Does the Failure to Provide
Similar Services Send a Message?
A more challenging context for an expressive harm test is gov-
ernment allocation of municipal services. This part will examine
two cases in which plaintiffs brought civil rights challenges against
government agencies for the allegedly disparate provision of ser-
vices.
In Tolbert v. the State of Ohio Department of Transportation
("ODOT"),2 68 African-American residents of the Cherrywood
apartment complex claimed that ODOT discriminated against
them on the basis of race when it provided sound barriers in a
white neighborhood to protect them from the noise of a newly
267. Coleman v Miller, 117 F3d 527, 529 (11th Cir. 1997).
268. 172 F.3d 934, 936 (6th Cir. 1999). After the remand to the district court, the par-
ties settled the action. Conversation with Norman Chachkin, NAACP Legal Defense Fund
(March 2002).
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constructed highway, but did not provide sound barriers to the
Cherrywood residents.211
The case involved two highway expansions planned by ODOT:
the Parkway and Interstate 75. The northbound lanes of the Park-
way are located 75 to 100 feet from Cherrywood.270 The residents
of Cherrywood are 84% African-American. 2 7 A noise analysis of the
effect of the Parkway indicated that it would raise the noise level
from 79 decibels to 90 decibels. ODOT decided not to provide
sound barriers or other mitigation measures, claiming that existing
background noise levels made sound barriers impractical.
274Interstate 75 traverses an area that is 86% whiteY. According to
a noise analysis, the widening of 1-75 would result in noise levels
between 70 and 82 decibels, "creating an increase of no more than
three decibels above the original sound level." 275 The noise analysis
recommended against constructing sound barriers, but ODOT
nonetheless decided to construct them.
In this case, the district court held that the plaintiffs had failed
to allege sufficient facts to establish a claim of intentional dis-
276crimination. Were an expressive test applicable, plaintiffs would
allege that ODOT's decision to provide sound barriers to a white
community but to deny them to an African-American community,
when the sound-level increase was greater in the African American
community, suggests that the Cherrywood residents are worthy of
less concern and respect than the similarly situated white residents.
Plaintiffs may also argue that ODOT's differential treatment sug-
gested that there is an insider and an outsider group delineated
along racial lines. This appears to be a relatively straightforward
case in which the facts point to differential treatment that could
lead a reasonable member of the affected community to conclude
that race affected the type of services the government chose to
provide. However, it is certainly possible that an objective observer
would conclude that the government actions sent no such message
because each decision was distinct and made at a different point in
time and thus could not be considered a message.





274. Id. at 937.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 941.
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Under either standard, plaintiffs would have more difficulty with
the facts presented in New York City Environmental Justice Alliance v.
Giuliani.21' The New York City Environmental Justice Alliance
(NYCEJA) and a host of other community groups and individuals
claimed that city officials' decision to sell community garden lots
for housing development had a disparate impact on people of
color. Along with evidence that the majority of community garden
lots are located predominantly in communities of color, plaintiffs
submitted evidence that community gardens play an important
role in community life-including contributing to community co-
hesion and pride, providing a place for cultural activities, and free
space for family celebrations.' 8
The Second Circuit of New York affirmed a dismissal by the dis-
trict court on two grounds. First, the court held that plaintiffs had
failed to establish that minorities would be adversely affected.279
While the court accepted the evidence that the majority of gardens
closed would be in communities of color, the court noted that the
majority of all gardens were in communities of color.280 Because a
benefit was provided in greater proportion to communities of
color, curtailing this benefit did not raise an inference of discrimi-
nation. 2s1 The more relevant measure, according to the court, was
the overall provision of park space.2 The court held that the ab-
sence of evidence showing that the city's provision of open space
and parkland was discriminatory rendered the evidence inade-
2823quate. Second, the court held that, even had a disparate impact
been shown, the provision of affordable housing was sufficient jus-
tification for any harm the closing of the community gardens
might have caused.2 4
Many people of color in New York were very angry when then
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani attempted to close the community gar-
285dens. However, were an expressive harm test to apply, on the
277. 214 E3d 65 (2d Cir. 2000).
278. Id. at 69.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 71.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 71-72.
284. Id. at 72.
285. See, e.g., Associated Press, 62 Arrested in City Garden Protest, NEWSDAY, May 6, 1999,
at A38 ("Shouts of 'Save the gardens, stop the auction!' drowned out a police officer's warn-
ing that protesters sitting on Chambers Street between Greenwich and West Streets would
be arrested on disorderly conduct charges. One man stood and tried to shove lilacs into the
officer's bullhorn. 'Once it's bulldozed and sold, there's no going back,' 52-year-old Alice
Morris said of her little plot known as Albert's Garden. 'It'll be a terrible tragedy."'); David
M. Herszenhorn, Two More Suits Seek to Stop Sale of Gardens, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999 at B2
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facts as presented, it seems unlikely that plaintiffs would prevail.
Plaintiffs may attempt to argue that the closing of the gardens
showed a lack of equal concern and respect for communities of
color. However, even using a reasonable community member stan-
dard, a court may not be persuaded. First, the lack of evidence that
the City has in fact provided greater access to parks to whites than
minorities would render the claim somewhat weak. The second
issue presents an even greater hurdle: it is difficult to discern a rea-
sonable view in which the decision to provide affordable housing
rather than community gardens conveys an inappropriate attitude.
Because the conflict was not a clear cut instance of the government
favoring one group over another, however angry some people in
the community were, a constitutional violation could not be estab-
lished.286
C. Critiques: Defining Community Itself
Violates Equal Protection
This section addresses the major critique that the proposed rea-
sonable community member standard will engender: that any
attempt to construct a reasonable member of a particular commu-
nity itself is inconsistent with the ideals underlying the Equal
Protection Clause because it rests upon the offensive (and clearly
inaccurate) presumption that people who happen to be of the11287
same race or gender all have the same view of the world. This hasbeen a common critique of the reasonable woman standard, levied
('sale [of city gardens] would violate the civil rights of minority New Yorkers, who "have
dramatically less access to green recreational space than its white residents.")
286. However, the lawsuit and accompanying political action had salutary effects. Dur-
ing the course of the litigation, a not-for-profit organization bought 150 of the most popular
community gardens to maintain their garden status. Dan Barry, Sudden Deal Saves Gardens Set
forAuction, N.Y.TIMES, May 13, 1999, at B1.
287. A second likely critique is that this proposal will fail because it will be impossible
for white judges to interpret the world from any but their own perspective. See RICHARD
DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? 4-36 (1995). Delgado's work does not focus on the
inability ofjudges to empathize, but rather on the abilities of white public interest lawyers.
Delgado claims that lawyers generally, and white liberal lawyers particularly, are singularly
unable to do more than engage in "a sentimental, breast-beating kind of [empathy]" in
which the lawyer actually becomes complicit in his client's oppression. Id. at 12. But see pow-
ell, supra note 100, at 112. In his article, jon powell suggests that Delgado is describing not
empathy but rather bathos-a term of literary criticism referring to the "unexpected appear-
ance of the vulgar or the base in otherwise elevated language." powell, supra note 100, at 11.
He posits that real empathy is possible, though difficult to attain, and requires a willingness
"to identify constraints, including power and hierarchy." Id. at 115.
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by some women's groups as well as by some conservative critics.2ss
For example, the Supreme Court of Michigan declined to adopt
the reasonable woman standard, claiming to be persuaded by
amicus curiae University of Michigan Women and Law Clinic
which argued that "the 'reasonable woman' standard may rein-
force the notion that women are 'different' from men and
therefore need special treatment-a notion that has disenfran-
chised women in the workplace.,
2 9
While these arguments are cause for concern, I think that the
benefits of a reasonable community standard applied as part of an
expressive harm exceed any potential costs. 29 In determining how
a reasonable member of community would view a certain action,
the definition of the community is not permanent. Rather, it is cir-
cumscribed only for purposes of the particular government action
that caused the alleged harm. A reference back to the example of
the two hotel guests may provide a useful analogy. The white and
black men were in opposing interpretive communities with regard
to the valet misidentification, which demarcated different perspec-
tives on race issues. However, they may be in the same interpretive
community with regard to a suggestive comment to a female co-
worker because such a comment may demarcate different perspec-
tives on gender issues. So too, an interpretive community created
by one government action may splinter into opposing interpretive
communities in response to another. The only claim that is being
made about a particular interpretive community is that people in it
are likely to respond to a message in a certain way because of their
membership in the community. The claim is not that every single
person who fits into the interpretive community actually feels a
certain way.
People enter interpretive communities of this sort all the time.
For example, if New York City decides to rebuild Yankee stadium
288. See, e.g., Radtke v. Everett, 501 N.W.2d 155, 166-67 (Mich. 1993).
289. Id. at 167 n.37 (quoting Cheryl L. Dragel, Note, Hostile Environment Sexual Harass-
ment: Should the Ninth Circuit's "Reasonable Woman" Standard be Adopted, II J.L. & COM. 237,
254 (1992)).
290. Two scholars, Koppleman and Seidman Diamond, have proposed that in Estab-
lishment Clause or Equal Protection cases in which an expressive harm test is applied, the
court should determine the meaning of the government action by relying upon results of
surveys as is done in trademark litigation. Seidman Diamond & Koppleman, supra note 171.
This proposal would avoid the problem of essentializing because the court would not be
attempting to delineate a single "reasonable" perspective, but would presumably accept the
majority view. However, such surveys would apply easily only to purely symbolic acts such as
flying a Confederate flag. It would be much more difficult to design a survey adequate to
determine the meaning of government acts such as the provision of differing levels of ser-
vices. The litigation may well devolve into battles over which survey was designed properly.
In addition, it would be very expensive for plaintiffs to undertake survey efforts.
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but not Shea stadium, Mets fans will likely feel ill-treated. Needless
to say, the creation of such an interpretive community does not
rise to a constitutional moment. However, it is not considered an
affront to acknowledge that Mets fans will respond differently than
Yankee fans to a certain set of facts. The corollary that does raise a
potential Equal Protection concern is if New York City spends
money disproportionately to abate lead paint in apartment houses
in all-white sections of the City and fails to do the same for apart-
ment houses in African-American and Latino parts of town. In
response to that message, African-Americans and Latinos in these
areas of town are placed in an interpretive community-and are
likely to view the action as suggesting that they are less worthy of
concern and respect. Indeed, the whites who live in these same
neighborhoods are also in the same interpretive community. They
reasonably may view the action as suggesting that their neighbor-
hood is treated less well because it is predominantly minority, and
thus they are victimized by this ill-treatment.
In other words, seeking to determine the point of view of a rea-
sonable member of an affected community should not require a
court to engage in the type of racial or gender essentializing that
undermine the goals of the Equal Protection Clause. There is no
claim that people who belong to a certain racial or gender group
share any characteristic other than the perception that the gov-
ernment has acted unfairly. Even if there is unlikely to be a
consensus as to particulars between members of a racial group or
gender, when issues arise regarding fairness in treatment of a
group to which one belongs, it is likely that there is shared con-
cern about that treatment. 9'
291. See, e.g. TIM B. HEATON, BRUCE A. CHADWICK, & CARDELL K. JACOBSON, STATISTI-
CAL HANDBOOK ON RACIAL GROUPS IN THE UNITED STATES, 323 (2000) (71.4% of blacks but
only 28.1% of whites think the government spends too little improving the condition of
blacks, while 59.4% of whites and 59.7% of blacks believe the government spends too little
protecting the environment). Zachary Carter, a former United States Attorney for the East-
ern District of New York, describes a working group of African American United States
Attorneys focusing on the sentencing disparities between crack and powder cocaine sen-
tencing. The First Annual Northeastern People of Color Legal Scholarship Conference: Law Professors
of Color in the Postmodern World, comments by Zachary Carter in panel discussion: Status, Pro-
gress, and Integration of Lawyers of Color in the Legal Profession, 19 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 111, 114
(1997). Carter notes that the effect of the disparities has been to imprison an enormous
number of young black men for sentences of 10 years or more. Id. There was no consensus
as to whether there should be equalization or some level of disparity, but "there was consen-
sus that the 100-1 ratio did not represent a warranted level of disparity." Id. at 115. It is
unlikely that a working group of white United States Attorneys would reach the same con-
sensus or would address the disparities.
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CONCLUSION
Expressivism has great promise to better effectuate the Equal
Protection Clause's goal of ensuring equal concern and respect.
However, this promise is unlikely to be realized if the majority
group's perspective determines the meaning of a challenged gov-
ernment action. While racism has certainly declined following the
Civil Rights Movement, it is a sad but enduring fact that race con-
tinues to shape people's experiences in this country. Because
membership in a racial minority affects one's experiences, it also
affects one's perceptions. If these differences are ignored by courts
applying expressive theory to Equal Protection challenges of gov-
ernment actions, minority plaintiffs will continue to face
overwhelming odds against finding redress in the courts. By con-
trast, ifjudges are directed to view the government action from the
perspective of a reasonable member of the affected community,
the experiences and perspective of members of the community will
become central to the inquiry. Judges will have an incentive to
empathize with community members in order properly to decide
how a reasonable person would view the government's action.
Government officials will also be given an incentive to empathize
with community members prior to making decisions so that their
actions are less likely to be challenged. Expressivism will then have
a much greater likelihood of leading to true equality.
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